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ABSTRACT

The document examines underlying issues related to moral philosophy and points out recent trends in moral education. The main purpose of the document is to provide background information for classroom educators in Australia as they develop moral education programs. The booklet is presented in eight chapters. Chapter I introduces the controversy over public school involvement in moral education and provides an overview of moral education since World War II. Chapter II reviews recent trends in moral philosophy, focusing on works by Iris Murdoch and G. J. Warnock. Chapter III examines interdisciplinary aspects of moral education. Chapter IV discusses Lawrence Kohlberg's research on developmental stages of moral judgment. Chapter V combines ideas of Emil Durkheim, Robert Dreeben, and William Kay to provide a sociological perspective on theories of moral education. Chapter VI reviews R. S. Peter's philosophical studies of the relationship between moral education and the ideal of rational man. Chapter VII discusses curriculum planning in moral education and summarizes an Australian moral education curriculum. The final chapter offers conclusions: facts and values must be related in moral inquiry; education should promote moral values associated with honesty, integrity, humility, objectivity, and impartiality; and moral education programs must take into account a complex variety of non-school influences such as parents, peers, and the media. (DB)

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Bearings in Moral Education:

A Critical Review of Recent Work

Brian Crittenden



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Note on the author

Professor Brian Crittenden holds a chair and was former Dean in the School
of Education at La Trobe University, Victoria. He works primarily within
the Centre for the Study of Curriculum and Teacher Education.

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1 : INTRODUCTION

One of the consequences of insisting on the secular character of public education was that in most liberal democratic societies the schools came to regard systematic moral education as being outside their proper role. It was commonly assumed that morality was inextricably tied to religion and that, therefore, the kind of neutrality adopted towards religion, given the policy of religious pluralism and the separation of Church and State, should extend to morality. Some of this attitude still exists, although it is now fairly generally recognized that morality does not necessarily depend on religious beliefs. But the recognition of this distinction did not remove the obstacle to the public school's engagement in moral education.¹ For, in the course of the present century, liberal democracies have come to display a wide variety of moral systems, secular as well as religious. The general policy of pluralism thus seemed to require the public schools not to become involved in moral education, even though morality could be treated independently of religion.

Many different factors influence what at any time the school curriculum includes or omits. In the case of moral education, the perception of the nature of morality has probably been the most crucial factor. In addition to the issues I have mentioned, there were several other prevalent assumptions about morality that deterred the schools from venturing into moral education. The following are, I think, among the most important.

1 The logical empiricist doctrine of a sharp divorce between facts and values has exercised a pervasive influence. In this view, genuine knowledge consists of, or is grounded on, matters of fact, claims that can be verified through observation. Value claims are not statements of fact or entailed by facts and thus do not constitute knowledge; they are simply expressions of taste or feeling.

2 Apart from the theoretical argument of the logical empiricists, there has been, in practice, a stark contrast between the substantial agreement attained in the fields of science, and the radical disagreement that has persisted on moral questions and even on the general

nature of morality itself. The evidence of diversity between cultures and within the one society has readily led to the conclusion that moral beliefs are incurably relative to a group or even subjective, that morality does not (even if it could) constitute anything like a rational body of beliefs and mode of inquiry. Hence, even if the policy of pluralism was not an issue, there did not seem to be an appropriate subject of morality, whether in principle or in fact, for the school to teach.

3 It was also widely believed that morality was concerned merely with standards of personal conduct and did not extend to the domains of public action. The distinction reflected the strong influence of legal positivism, in which the law of the State is the final determinant of what should be done in the political, economic, social, and other significant aspects of public life.

Even when the schools were studiously avoiding any systematic program of moral education, they did not — and could not — escape some engagement in moral education. At the very least, they inculcated the moral practices that were essential to the school as a social institution (e.g. honesty, truthfulness, some degree of consideration for the feelings of others, and a concern for one another's welfare in the life of the school). Public schools also often explicitly upheld various moral values associated with citizenship.

Every significant theory of education has embodied an ideal of human excellence, and has placed emphasis on the development of character. Although a school may intend to preserve strict silence on conflicting moral values, it is virtually impossible to implement a curriculum — however fragmented and preoccupied with 'facts' it may be — without some reference to what are thought to be the standards of a worthwhile human life. In so far as schools are serious about educating, they must at least be committed to the development of the intellectual virtues (such as honesty, integrity, humility, objectivity), and these have an obvious moral aspect. But schools have inescapably engaged in moral education (or miseducation) at another level, often beyond the awareness of the teachers. What has come to be called the hidden curriculum is largely concerned with morally significant attitudes and practices (e.g. learning from the daily experience of the classroom about public authority and how to respond to it; recognizing the importance given to competition in our society

and acquiring the approved ways of competing).

During the past few decades important changes in the interpretation of morality took shape in western societies. Their clear emergence in the 1960s has provoked, or at least supported, a radical re-thinking of the school's role in moral education. I shall not attempt to examine in any detail the causes or nature of these changes. For our purpose, probably the most important development has been the undermining of legal positivism. It is now generally recognized that there is a clear distinction between the legal and moral domains, that the law is subject to moral criteria, and that moral standards and ideals are as fundamental in the public sphere as in the private. There is even a set of general moral principles — in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights — that is widely accepted as applying to human beings everywhere and affecting the conduct of governments and societies as well as individuals.

Among the many causes for the re-interpretation of morality, the conduct of the Nazi regime and the whole experience of the Second World War were obviously crucial. People generally were brought to see in a very vivid way that there are indeed crimes against humanity, and thus to question, at least in effect, the assumptions of legal positivism and moral relativism. Despite its vagueness, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 was an affirmation of the primacy of morality over law and of a belief in moral values common to all human beings. The struggle for full civil rights for blacks in the United States highlighted the distinction between moral and legal rights and the subordination of civil laws to moral standards. The same points are continually being reiterated in the virtually endless effort to achieve civil rights for various oppressed groups in many parts of the world. The intense debate over the Vietnam War made the distinction between law and morality fully explicit and underlined its significance. There was argument over whether the US was legally engaged in war; but, whether the war was legal or not, the fundamental argument was about its morality. This was the main ground on which the case for civil disobedience was defended. In the past decade or so, the moral debate has extended beyond the issues of war and peace, civil rights, and the equitable distribution of goods to such questions as the treatment of animals and of the physical environment, and the responsibility of each generation in

relation to future generations. A growing knowledge of unexpected side effects and long-term consequences of scientific technology has contributed to moral concern in most of these areas.

I do not wish to imply by any means that all the changes in the understanding of morality or all the aspects of the new moral enthusiasm are desirable. In regard to the understanding of morality, there has been, for example, a tendency to see the whole of morality in terms of rights. In giving proper weight to morality in social issues, people have often swung to the opposite extreme from which they are reacting, and have underplayed the importance of personal morality. In regard to contemporary moral practice, it often displays a curious admixture of conflicting elements: for example an over-rationalistic application of certain moral principles without any concern for local traditions and experience combined with naive romanticism, or a frightening moral absolutism on some questions combined with total permissiveness on others. One may also be sceptical of the motives of some present-day moral enthusiasts. The invocation of moral justifications or condemnations can be a very effective weapon of propaganda in the struggle for power against established authority. For some people, the untiring commitment to every fashionable moral cause seems to act as a substitute to religion in providing an ultimate meaning and purpose to their lives.

Given the development of a strong interest among people generally in the moral aspects of social issues, it is hardly surprising that the schools have begun to take a much more active part in moral education. Apart from other reasons, the view that the school should respond to felt social needs has a wide appeal, and there is always the anxiety to be relevant. But the changes I have mentioned — particularly in the general interpretation of morality — are related to the role of the school in a more fundamental way. They have undermined whatever justification the public schools may have had for their policy of non-involvement in moral education. Consider, for example, the school's part in the education of responsible citizens. During the time in which the fundamental importance of moral values in social questions has been increasingly recognized, renewed attention has also been given to theories of participatory democracy, and there has been a significant increase in the level of citizen participation in decisions of public policy. Learning how to take part in

moral arguments on social issues has now become, if it was not before, a crucial element in the education of citizens for a democracy. The public school's policy of silence on religion may perhaps still be justified but, given the part that moral values play in society (and are now generally recognized as playing), there can be no justification for such a policy towards morality. The difficult problem of moral pluralism still confronts the public school. It is one that must be faced in any attempt to provide an adequate theory (and program) of moral education. What can be recognized as a starting point is that silence is not an appropriate solution, that the question of neutrality in moral education requires a much more sophisticated and complex interpretation.²

Whether schools embark systematically on programs of moral education or not, the presence of a serious debate on moral issues in the society generally is bound to be reflected in the schools. It has not been uncommon in the past few years for teachers to advocate moral positions on controversial social questions under the guise of teaching English or History or General Studies — or even Mathematics. It is essential that schools engage systematically in moral education, but with a clear understanding of what it is about and what the specific role and responsibility of the school should be.³ Moral education is a complex and delicate matter and requires distinct knowledge and skills in those who teach it. In addition to the pedagogical issues, such teachers must also respect the special moral conditions (related, for example, to avoiding indoctrination, taking account of moral pluralism) that apply to the school's role in moral education.

My purpose in this paper is to assist teachers and others interested in moral education to examine more closely the directions it has recently taken and some of the underlying issues. During the past decade, a substantial volume of curriculum material in moral education has been published, and considerable work has been done in the various dimensions of the theory of moral education. In the same period there have been some important developments in ethics — the philosophical study of the practice of morality. I shall attempt to provide a critical review of some of the most significant work in these areas. The review will be severely selective not only because the scope of the field is so extensive, but also because I believe it is more

useful to engage in an analysis and evaluation of several major contributions than to present a summary catalogue of virtually everything. The selection will of course reflect my own judgment. However, while there would no doubt be disagreement over what I have chosen to omit, I doubt whether there would be any serious demurrals on the importance of what I have included.

I shall first discuss some recent trends in general ethical theory. This section will be followed by an examination of work on the theory of moral education, beginning with the question of a general theory, and proceeding, in turn, to psychological, sociological, and philosophical studies of moral education. I shall then discuss some of the main features of recent curriculum development and illustrate by reference to specific projects. The review will conclude with comments on some of the most crucial issues that have emerged, in particular the question of pluralism and neutrality.

2 : RECENT TRENDS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY

Morality — like art, government, and other important human practices — can be studied from various points of view: historically, sociologically, and so on. But it is probably correct to say that ethics, or the philosophical study of morality, has the strongest bearing on the shape of the practice and the way in which it is understood. Certainly the philosophical perspective is crucial if we are to grapple effectively with the questions that underlie a program of teaching and learning in moral education. In the present context, it is important to note first the predominant characteristics of ethics in the English-speaking world during the present century; they have clearly influenced much of the important curriculum material and other work in moral education that is available to our schools. What is particularly interesting is that, as we shall see, there has been a serious challenge in the past decade to the characteristic style of ethics by ethical theorists themselves. The change of direction is, I believe, likely to provide a sounder philosophical basis for moral education.

Through most of this century, ethical theorists have usually drawn a sharp distinction between normative ethics (which discusses moral issues and the criteria of what is morally good and right) and metaethics (which examines such matters as the distinguishing features of moral beliefs, the logic of moral claims, how morality is justified). Virtually all their energies have been concentrated on metaethical questions: in particular, the meaning of the general moral terms such as 'good', 'ought', 'right', 'duty', and the logical status of moral beliefs and arguments. It has generally been assumed that, while metaethics may illuminate our understanding of morality, it is strictly neutral in relation to normative moral questions.

Because of the preoccupation with metaethics, philosophical writing in this century has tended to treat morality at a high level of abstraction and has disregarded the features of detail that are often crucial to morality in practice. As a consequence of this abstract level of attention, several of the most significant features of ethical theory during this period seem to give an artificial, if not distorted,

interpretation when brought into contact with the reality of moral practice.⁴ The main features of this kind are the following:

1 Analysis has concentrated on only the most general formal concepts ('good', 'ought', etc.) and has neglected the more substantial moral concepts such as 'justice', 'compassion', 'honesty', 'courage'.

2 By comparing facts as such with values as such, ethical theorists have commonly supported a complete logical divorce between the two. This position has not simply emphasized that factual premises cannot entail normative conclusions, but has assumed that factual considerations cannot provide good reasons for or against moral beliefs. As a consequence, it has been claimed that ultimately we accept or reject moral values through a naked act of the will.

3 The accounts given of reasoning in morality have often been derived from pure logical models rather than from an analysis of what reasoned moral judgment involves in the complicated context of ideals, rules, duties, dispositions, attitudes, and feelings — often in conflict with one another — that make up the concrete practice of morality. One of the dominant views has interpreted moral reasoning as a strictly deductive process in which moral rules and principles fit together in a perfectly coherent logical pattern. In this scheme, the ultimate moral principles are formulated in a way that is independent of any social context.

4 In deciding what distinguishes a belief or judgment as a moral one (and thus what justifies the claim that such and such a belief or judgment is moral), it has been common for ethical theorists to look for one or a few essential features that any belief etc., claiming to be moral, must possess. One line of this approach, which from the time of Kant has exercised a large influence, relates closely to the position referred to in the previous point. It is the attempt to abstract completely from the varying content of moral practices by providing strictly formal criteria for what is to count as morality.

R. M. Hare is one of the best known exponents of a purely formal account.⁵ He focuses on the concept of 'ought'. If a person says 'I ought to do X', then regardless of what we substitute for X, this is a *moral* judgment, in Hare's view, if and only if (i) the speaker uses 'ought' in the sense that entails a desire or willingness to do whatever X is, and (ii) the speaker is prepared to grant that any

other human being in his circumstances ought to do X. Hare calls the first condition the prescriptive feature of a distinctively moral judgment. If someone says, 'I ought to do X, but so what? I'm not going to do it anyway', then he is not using 'ought' in its moral sense. He may be simply describing what is commonly expected of him in the society. To use 'ought' morally entails that we acknowledge its prescriptive character. Hare refers to the second condition as universalizability. If I make the claim, 'You ought to return what you have borrowed', as a moral judgment, I must be prepared to grant that I or anyone else in similar circumstances should do the same thing. If we satisfy these two conditions, it follows that whatever we advance as a moral reason must be considered as overriding in making a decision about what to do.⁶

I have referred particularly to Hare because, apart from his own writings on moral education, his formal theory is reflected in the work of Lawrence Kohlberg (a social psychologist) who, as we shall see, has expanded Piaget's developmental theory into one of the most influential theories of moral education at the present time. He claims to have established an invariant sequence of developmental stages in moral reasoning, in which each step is distinguished only by the form of reasoning used, not by the content of moral reasons or the judgments made. Hare has also strongly influenced the approach to moral education taken by John Wilson and his colleagues, on which I shall comment later.

It is obvious that a content-free account of morality would be particularly attractive to those concerned with moral education in the public schools of a morally pluralistic society. Schools and teachers would not have to take any stand on the substance of moral beliefs or judgments; their task need not go beyond the formal conditions that any moral judgment (regardless of its content) must logically satisfy. Whether such a strategy is desirable, or even possible, will be considered in the course of discussion.

The features I have outlined, which had almost acquired the status of orthodoxy in ethical theory, have been seriously questioned during the past ten years or so by philosophers working within the same broad tradition. I shall refer specifically to Iris Murdoch and G. J. Warnock.⁷ Before coming to their work it will be useful, I think, to sketch the broad lines along which the previously dominant views,

which still exert a substantial influence on the theory and practice of moral education, have been criticized.

1 In regard to the metaethical level of inquiry it has been pointed out that neutrality in relation to moral beliefs and systems exists only on the surface. Inevitably, metaethical theories reflect a selective view of what morality consists in, or of what is more or less important; their general conclusions then have the nature of prescriptions for how moral practices should be reconstructed. As Bernard Williams points out, even the kind of examples one selects in doing moral philosophy can have moral significance.⁸ Whether an author realizes it or not, no serious metaethical theory can avoid importing at least fragments of a particular interpretation of the nature of man.

In addition to the lack of strict neutrality claimed for metaethical theory, it has also been argued that the attempt to concentrate entirely on metaethics is detrimental to moral philosophy. To the extent that the objective is achieved, it tends to turn ethics into a branch of philosophical logic — to the neglect of other aspects of philosophy relevant to the study of morality, not to mention the work of other disciplines. In the absence of close attention to the complex practice of morality, a series of accounts of the logic of moral discourse has emerged, in which one aspect or another is treated as though it were the whole story.

The preoccupation with metaethical questions has also meant the neglect of fundamental substantial issues in the practice of morality that stand in need of philosophical argument. In recent years, there has been a notable renewal of interest among philosophers in both the general questions of normative ethics (e.g. the characteristics of a good man) and particular moral issues (e.g. punishment, civil disobedience, abortion, the treatment of animals).

2 The fact/value distinction reflects basic assumptions about the nature of knowledge and the conditions of objectivity. Against the sharp separation of facts and values, it has been pointed out that even in the concepts through which we describe and interpret physical phenomena there are aspects of valuing. (Some epistemologists have taken the extreme view that ultimately the conceptual schemes and modes of inquiry one uses in science are, like the domain of value, adopted by an arbitrary act of the will.) In regard to evalua-

tion generally (deciding, 'This is a good X'), it has been emphasized that there is knowledge about what an X is or does, and information about the particular X, that count for or against the truth of the evaluative judgment. It is of course a much more complex matter to judge that someone is a good man rather than, say, a good tennis player. However, a number of ethical theorists have defended a qualified form of naturalism in which facts about human needs, wants, and other characteristics delimit what may justifiably or even intelligibly be asserted as a moral value. In some cases it is possible to establish that an ethical theory is defective by showing that on philosophical, historical, or scientific grounds the assumptions it makes about human nature are mistaken.

In the moral practices that make up human life, facts and values are often intimately related. If we say that a person owes money, or has made a promise, or has acted deceitfully, these are statements of fact that also express an evaluation. It is not as though we first describe what the person has done in value-neutral terms and then decide what moral value, if any, we are going to attach to the action. The moral terms we use are an integral part of complex practices. They reflect beliefs about the significant aspects of human nature and of social relationships. The facts of owing, promising, etc. are observed because of their place in the scheme of moral values. A change in this scheme brings with it a change in the facts observed.⁹

3 The deductive model of moral reasoning — in which major premises that express one's value choices are combined with particular factual premises to entail a prescriptive conclusion — in part comes under the criticism of the fact/value distinction. More generally, serious questions have been raised about the assumption that the principles of morality form a completely consistent deductive system. Moral values sometimes make irreconcilable demands; it is not always possible to demonstrate that one way of acting, all things considered, is the best. The attempt to found all moral rules in a society, and their use in reaching moral decisions, on Kantian-type universal formal principles oversimplifies such rules and the factors that may need to be accounted for in the concrete circumstances of moral judgment. What has been stressed is that the nature of practical judgment in the complicated domain of morality cannot be assimilated to the relatively simple neat model of either formal deductive

logic or scientific induction. As Rush Rhees has noted,

... in many — perhaps most — questions of morals the decision has to come from me (from the man who faces it); and *whatever the role of reasons etc. may be, they are never conclusive in the way the steps of a mathematical proof are*, nor in the way in which material evidence of guilt in connection with a crime may be.¹⁰

4 The attempt to distinguish the moral from the non-moral on the basis of a few essential common features has been criticized for imposing far too simple a pattern on the complex practice of morality. It is comparable to supposing that, despite the enormous variety of works of art, we can identify a set of defining characteristics that are necessary and sufficient for an object to be classified as a work of art. The over-simplification occurs whether morality is said to consist, by definition, of whatever rules of conduct effectively promote some non-moral end or of whatever rules exhibit certain formal characteristics.

Earlier I referred in particular to the identification of morality in terms of formal criteria (specifically in Hare's theory), mainly because of its influence on moral education through Kohlberg's work. (A purely formal account also relates directly to the advocacy of the fact/value distinction: what may be asserted as a moral belief is free from the burden of any conceptual or factual claims relating to content.) On the issue of over-simplification, several theorists have pointed out that there are rules and judgments which do not satisfy the universalizable criterion, and yet which could not, except by arbitrary stipulation, be regarded as anything but moral.¹¹

It has also been argued that, while from one point of view the purely formal criteria are too restrictive, from another they are too inclusive. Not only may other distinct kinds of value judgment, e.g. aesthetic or prudential, satisfy the formal criteria, but also judgments that would commonly be recognized as immoral. With suitable qualifications, virtually any principle can be universalized without inconsistency as a rule of morality. As Warnock's work will illustrate, there has recently been a firm reiteration of the view that, whatever role formal criteria may play, the sphere of morality cannot be adequately identified without reference to a range of content.

Iris Murdoch: Morality and the Ideal of Perfection

Against this background, I turn now to a discussion of Iris Murdoch's

view in *The Sovereignty of Good*.¹² In this book she delivers a vigorous attack on the dominant style of moral philosophy, some of the main features of which we have been considering, and proposes at least in outline a rather different view.

According to Murdoch, the mainstream of English-speaking ethical theory has worked on a false image of the individual as a moral agent. Knowledge, interpreted on a scientific model, is treated as wholly impersonal and subject to public criteria. The only features that are personal to the self — and as such outside the control of knowledge — are intermittent acts of willing, evidenced in the choices a person makes and the things he does. Values are determined by each individual through these decisions of the isolated will. The concept of good is defined in the public world of knowledge by purely formal criteria; what things are to count as good are, as it were, written into the blank cheque by acts of the will.

In this scheme, there is no substantial enduring self, and the metaphors or vision associated with such a concept are displaced by those of movement. Mental concepts are intelligible only to the extent that they can be analysed genetically in reference to publicly observable activity.

What I am 'objectively' is not under my control; logic and observers decide that. What I am 'subjectively' is a foot-loose, solitary, substanceless will. Personality dwindles to a point of pure will.¹³

In the absence of any enduring self or any other permanent background to human activity, 'the agent, thin as a needle, appears in the quick flash of the choosing will'.¹⁴ Murdoch emphasizes the similarity between this image of man and that of existentialism. In both of them freedom in the choice of values is exercised in a void, 'an empty, lonely freedom' cut off from knowledge. They are both in the tradition of the Kantian godman, whose will is the creator of values.¹⁵

In pointing out the image of man that underlies the dominant moral philosophy, Murdoch makes clear how far it is from a neutral analysis of the logic of moral language.

The merits of linguistic analytical man are freedom (in the sense of detachment, rationality), responsibility, self-awareness, sincerity and a lot of utilitarian common sense. There is of course no mention of sin, and no mention of love. Marxism is ignored, and there is on the whole no attempt at a rapprochement with psychology.¹⁶

It is not simply that these moral philosophers have in fact failed to

be neutral; in the nature of the activity, they could not avoid taking sides.¹⁷

For an adequate moral philosophy Murdoch suggests two requirements: (i) that it should be realistic in being closely linked to the attributes that human beings actually have, and (ii) that it should commend a worthy ideal of moral conduct (not stick simply with the mediocre) and examine how it might be achieved. In its analytic aspect, moral philosophy should accept the variety in the forms of moral life as given, 'and not try to *get behind them* to a single form'.¹⁸

What Murdoch finds most objectionable in the ethical theory of linguistic analysis (and existentialism) is its rejection of a substantial self. Her main argument against this view is that, whatever may be said about the concepts we employ in the realm of science, our moral concepts are inescapably coloured by our personal history. Through experience we may develop in our understanding of what it is, for example, to love another human being or to act courageously. From the fact that we can make progress in this way, we recognize indirectly an ideal of perfection. Knowing moral concepts is not, therefore, simply a matter of conforming to the impersonal rules for the use of certain words in the public language. This genetic account does not do justice to the reality of moral consciousness.

The self is thus not an isolated will but a complex fabric of personal knowledge and attitudes. Morality (and moral education) is as much concerned with moral consciousness (how we perceive other persons and things, what we characteristically desire and so on) as with moral action. To act rightly depends fundamentally on the moral quality of the self, not on pure acts of the will.¹⁹ For this reason, Murdoch argues for the priority of the metaphor of vision over that of movement in interpreting morality.

In regard to the question of freedom specifically, the argument for a substantial inner self possessing personal knowledge runs counter to the sharp distinction between facts and values and to the role ascribed to the will of creating values independently of knowledge. In Murdoch's interpretation, freedom is intimately tied to the personal knowledge we develop through the continual effort of attending with moral imagination (again the association of facts and values) to what people and situations really are. It is how we

exercise attention in between the moments of choice that matters.

Man is not a combination of an impersonal rational thinker and a personal will. He is a unified being who sees, and who desires in accordance with what he sees, and who has some continual slight control over the direction and focus of his vision.²⁰

Several aspects of Murdoch's alternative interpretation of morality have emerged in the review of her criticisms. The main additional features to which I would draw attention are these:

1 Unlike the general run of contemporary moral theories, which are preoccupied with the notion of right, Murdoch supports a version of the more inclusive view of morality in which the notion of good predominates.

The area of morals, and ergo of moral philosophy, can now be seen, not as a hole-and-corner matter of debts and promises, but as covering the whole of our mode of living and the quality of our relations with the world.²¹

Morality consists essentially in the effort to shape one's consciousness and actions in accordance with the concept of the Good — the idea of perfection. It is the Good, not the will of the individual, that is transcendent in the practice of morality.

2 The way to a knowledge of the Good is primarily through the effort of attending unselfishly in order to see people and things as they really are: '... a refined and honest perception of what is really the case, a patient and just discernment and exploration of what confronts one ...'.²² (again an activity of knowing in which facts and values intermingle). We thus develop our knowledge of the Good indirectly: we realize that we do not create values by our own choice; we recognize different levels of good and evil in human character and action; we come across experiences — such as unselfish love — that provide evidence of a transcendent ideal.

3 Viewed negatively, the central task of morality is the overcoming of selfishness, what Murdoch refers to as 'the fat relentless ego'.²³ This is achieved to the extent that a person's capacity for love is refined in being directed more and more fully to the Good (and to the world as it manifests the Good). Love holds primacy, therefore, among the moral virtues. It is linked closely in Murdoch's interpretation with the virtue of humility: the acceptance of the reality of basic conditions of human life that deflate self-importance (the transience of life, the role that chance plays, the inevitability of death).

4 Murdoch places special stress on an analogy between morality and the making and appreciating of great art.²⁵ The achievement (and appreciation) of a great work of art demands detachment from self-interest and the giving of close attention, informed by respect and compassion, to the qualities that are really there in the object. Such art shows us what a disciplined attention in the effort to appreciate beauty can reveal about things and how an object can be loved unselfishly.

In Murdoch's theory, the relationship of art to morality is much more than an analogy. The making or appreciating of great art also directly realizes moral values in altering the quality of consciousness 'in the direction of unselfishness, objectivity and realism', in presenting 'a truthful image of the human condition in a form which can be steadily contemplated', in giving perspicuous examples of how human beings can combine realistic vision with compassion — and in a number of other ways briefly mentioned in a compressed passage. It is obvious that for Murdoch the study of great art would hold a crucial place in moral education. ('Art . . . is the most educational of all human activities and a place in which the nature of morality can be *seen*.')²⁶

As Murdoch herself emphasizes, the moral theory she advocates bears a strong Platonic influence. Against the metaphors of movement that characterize the behaviourally inclined moral philosophy of linguistic analysis, she re-asserts the metaphors of vision (the quality of one's moral life depends on how one typically sees the world). Plato's myth of the cave — in which the sun is the symbol of the Good and men move from seeing shadows in an inferior light to seeing the real world in the light of the sun and may come eventually to a vision of the sun itself — still holds the clue to an adequate understanding of the nature of morality. In its main features, Murdoch's theory may also be interpreted as an attempt to provide a secular version of the Christian ethical ideal. There is an enormous difference in the understanding of morality if one believes that the Good is not simply a concept of perfection but a supreme personal Being with whom human beings have a morally fundamental relationship of love and obedience.²⁷

The critical part of Murdoch's work draws out, in a clear and original way, the main weaknesses in the moral philosophy of lingu-

istic analysis that have recently been noted by a number of ethical theorists. Additional points are raised that others have not commented on (e.g. the preoccupation with action to the neglect of the quality of moral consciousness). The arguments tend to go to the roots of the issues more effectively than those of most other critics.

The positive proposal Murdoch makes for an alternative view of morality is, I believe, somewhat less successful. I am not quarrelling with its general purpose — in particular, to support a morality of good (and not simply of right), to stress the role of knowledge in the exercise of freedom and the interplay of facts and values in moral knowledge, to focus on the quality of moral consciousness in relation to action, and to give a central place to the virtue of love. The major weakness is in the excessive vagueness and obscurity of the account given of the Good and how it is known. In this respect, the Platonic allusions are more confusing than helpful. (In the summary that I have given, I am by no means sure that I have accurately expressed Murdoch's meaning.) The style of literary essay that Murdoch uses is effective for conveying a general impression: the key features are revisited in changing contexts through the course of the discussion; but at the crucial points the argument is not developed in a systematic detailed way.

Granted the personal aspect of moral knowledge, there is added reason for a closer consideration of the criteria of objectivity and justification for claims about what is in conformity with the Good. At one point, Murdoch speaks of the movement in one's understanding of moral concepts as being 'onward into increasing privacy'.²⁸ This is a dangerous situation for morality unless there are some fairly clear standards for distinguishing true moral vision from fanaticism or idiosyncrasy or ordinary sincere misguidedness.²⁹

Despite such deficiencies in the development of her argument, I believe Murdoch has re-introduced to contemporary moral philosophy fundamental themes that had generally come to be disregarded.

G. J. Warnock: *Morality and the Countervailing of Limited Sympathies*

The second recent work in ethical theory to which I wish to refer specifically is G. J. Warnock's *The Object of Morality*.³⁰ In their different ways, both Murdoch and Warnock build their general interpretations

of morality and their arguments about moral beliefs and values on the basis of facts about human beings and the conditions of human life. It is a qualified form of naturalism: evaluations are supported by descriptions, but are not reducible to them. It follows from such a view that we are not justifiably free to choose whatever we like as a moral value. This constraint is directly related to the further consequence that the attempt to distinguish what counts as moral discourse, in terms of formal or logical criteria without any assumptions about content, is mistaken. As we saw earlier, this attempt has been a characteristic of English-speaking moral philosophy. Warnock's work is of particular interest in that he takes the very opposite view: there are no unique logical features in the language of morals; what identifies moral discourse is its subject matter (what is being talked about and the grounds given or implied for what is said). His main purpose in *The Object of Morality* is 'to identify and understand the subject matter of moral discourse'.³¹ This purpose is worked out in a sustained and systematic argument, rich in detail and often fairly complex. Despite the obvious risk of over-simplification, I think the following summary gives a reasonably accurate picture of the argument's main features.

Human actions can be assessed as good or bad, right or wrong, from various points of view. Assessment from a moral point of view is only one kind of appraisal. The question is how we distinguish a moral appraisal from other kinds. In seeking an answer, we should expect that the boundaries of the moral domain will be somewhat blurred.

Moral concepts are employed to evaluate the actions of rational beings. Actions are the primary object of evaluation. Other things are of course assessed morally, but always in relationship to action. Moral judgment is concerned with what *rational* beings do, that is, beings who can perceive alternatives, appreciate reasons for acting, choose in the light of the reasons, and act on the basis of the choice made.

In evaluating, we always have some purpose in mind. The purpose of moral evaluation is to promote better actions — or at least avert worse actions — than would otherwise be likely to occur, and thus to ameliorate the conditions of human life. To understand what morality involves we must, therefore, ask what it is about the human

predicament that requires amelioration and how morality contributes to the amelioration.

The conditions of human life are such that things are liable to go badly, but what we can do or refrain from doing makes a difference to how badly. Human beings have many common and individual needs, wants, and interests that are neither naturally satisfied nor inevitably frustrated. Whether they are satisfied or not often depends on how human beings decide to act. There are various obstacles to the satisfying of human needs, etc. In the first place, they are often in conflict (both within one person and between people), so that it may not be possible to satisfy them all. Then there are several practical obstacles: limited resources, knowledge, and intelligence; limited rationality; limited sympathies (both in the sense of lacking concern and of being positively malevolent). Of all these obstacles, limited sympathy, although much of it may depend on limited rationality, seems to be the most crucial. *The specific purpose of morality in ameliorating the human predicament is to countervail limited sympathies.*

Among the factors that will enable things to go less badly in human life are the intelligent and informed use of material resources, effective human institutions, sanctions for encouraging/discouraging actions that increase/decrease human welfare, the acquiring of dispositions voluntarily to act or abstain from acting in order to ameliorate the human predicament.

The last of these is crucial because finally the appropriate use of the others depends on the existence of the dispositions to use them in that way. Among the dispositions (or virtues), there are two main types: those that develop capacities for acting/refraining from acting (e.g. courage, self-control), and those that direct the use of these capacities. The former are not directly moral virtues (they may be effective for immoral action). The *moral* virtues are of the second type. As noted earlier, they are directly related to countervailing limited sympathies. On this basis, at least the following are fundamental moral virtues: non-maleficence; beneficence; fairness; honesty (non-deception). From these virtues we can directly derive corresponding moral principles or standards (i.e. of fairness, honesty, etc.). Reasons belong to the moral domain when they encourage (or discourage) conformity to a moral principle.

In the course of developing his main argument, Warnock examines a considerable number of subsidiary questions. Among the more important conclusions he reaches are these:

1 Rules are not a necessary feature of morality. Where moral rules are made they are certainly not fundamental. In relation to any moral rule, one can always sensibly ask for the reasons that justify it.

2 Moral principles, although related, are distinct. There is, thus, a plurality of moral principles not reducible to an ultimate moral principle — although there is a single rationale for morality. In given cases there may be unresolvable conflict among moral principles.

3 An obligation is one moral reason along with others for acting or refraining from acting. Obligations generally (like promising specifically) are linked with the moral principle of truth-telling. They may be incurred implicitly by accepting offices, roles, etc.

4 Morality offers only a partial answer to the general question of how a person should live. Apart from excluding certain goals, its purpose is to articulate principles we should observe in pursuing whatever goals we seek.

Whether or not one agrees with Warnock's account of the subject-matter of moral discourse, I believe his argument clearly illustrates the advantage of exerting one's energies as an ethical theorist on the content of morality rather than on the quest for distinctive logical features of moral language.

In regard to the central thesis of Warnock's book, there is, I believe, one false basic assumption that has a distorting effect on the whole argument. In his general procedure, Warnock assumes that, because moral judgments, being practical, are made for the sake of effecting practical change, there must be a single purpose or objective for which all moral judgments are made. From this he moves to the more general assumption that morality as a whole is not only to be interpreted as a means, but as a means that serves a single end. One may question whether the key to adequate understanding of the practice of morality as a whole — so immediately concerned as it is with the ideals and standards of what is thought to constitute a fitting and worthwhile life — can possibly be found in treating it as a means to something else. Parts of the practice (e.g. judgments, reason giving, rules) do of course function in this way, and we may

look at the moral life from the points of view of process and achievement and treat these as being roughly in a means-to-end relationship. (Perhaps this is what Warnock has in mind.) But whatever may be argued on this question, it seems clearly mistaken to suppose that there is just one object (in Warnock's view the amelioration of the human predicament by countervailing limited sympathies) that the entire complex practice of morality is bent on achieving.

This reductive approach is less drastic than it might have been because, as we saw, Warnock insists on a plurality of moral principles. His view seems to differ from 'simple' utilitarianism (which he criticizes in Chapter 3) mainly in that he believes the amelioration of human life cannot be achieved through the practice of only one virtue. There is no doubt that the countervailing of limited sympathies is an important outcome of morality and, in so far as it is, Warnock builds a persuasive picture of what morality is about. But it is by no means the whole story.

Despite this criticism of the main thesis, there are many particular aspects of moral theory on which I believe his stand is clearly correct and effectively argued. His treatment of rules and their place in morality (Chapters 4 and 5) provides a significant example of such argument. Whether the case he makes on the nature of obligations is as effective as it might be, he is quite correct in stressing that they do not constitute the only moral reasons we may have for deciding what ought to be done. He is also right in refusing to reduce moral principles to a single ultimate principle.

* * *

I have referred to a general similarity in the approaches taken by Murdoch and Warnock. There are, of course, quite fundamental differences. In the present context I will draw attention to two of them. First in Murdoch's scheme, morality as the effort to achieve the ideal of the Good is not a means to promoting any desirable end outside itself, but simply for its own sake. ('The Good has nothing to do with purpose, indeed it excludes the idea of purpose.')³² This interpretation obviously contrasts with the key assumption in Warnock's procedure. Second Murdoch interprets the scope and depth of morality comprehensively: it covers 'the whole mode of our living'

and is a continual effort to achieve goodness as fully as we can, with perfection as the ideal limit. Warnock is concerned, on the other hand, with something more like 'basic' morality: the virtues and principles we need to live by in order to offset limited sympathies — at least to the point of preventing the conditions of human life from being worse than they otherwise might be.

Compared with Murdoch's splendid, if somewhat hazy, vision of morality, Warnock's view seems somewhat dull and meagre. In the conditions of moral pluralism, it is probably necessary (and some would argue desirable) for the schools to restrict themselves to the basic morality. If so, Warnock certainly provides a coherent blueprint for such a program. It would be a pity, however, if moral education were to lose sight entirely of the larger vision.³³

3 : THEORY OF MORAL EDUCATION: AS AN INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY

Although moral theorizing may be predominantly a philosophical enterprise, the task of building a comprehensive moral theory must include the contribution of various perspectives of inquiry. In addition to the work of the philosopher, it depends in particular, I think, on the findings of anthropologists, sociologists, and psychologists and on the insights of great artists. In relation to the last, while all art forms may enlarge our understanding of morality, I believe that literature plays a unique role. Morality also has important theoretical and practical links with religion and law. It is only in our relatively recent history that the lines of distinction between morality and these domains have been clearly drawn.

The task of putting together such multifarious aspects is extremely complex. Usually those who attempt a general theory of morality select and integrate their material from the perspective of one or perhaps two relevant disciplines (e.g. philosophy on its own or in combination with a social or behavioural science).³⁴ This may be all that can be achieved in practice, but it needs to be remembered that the resulting theory gives at best a somewhat oversimplified and partial interpretation of morality.

Apart from limitations due to theoretical perspective, our understanding may be distorted by treating one part of morality as though it was the whole or by giving it undue significance. As we saw in the previous section, this has not been an uncommon tendency among moral philosophers (e.g. the preoccupation with rules or obligations or a particular logical feature of moral language).

Although a comprehensive theory of morality depends on a multi-disciplinary approach, the integrating and basic method must, I believe, be philosophical. This is because of the key place of ethics in the study of morality and because moral theory is ultimately normative in character.

Most contributors to moral inquiry in the social and behavioural sciences have not tried to advance a general theory, but have worked

at piecemeal small-scale problems. Much of this work has been of fairly slight interest and value for an understanding of morality. This has been due largely, I believe, to two pervasive methodological assumptions: (i) that empirical inquiry is (or must try to be) value free, and (ii) that objectivity depends on the use of precisely quantifiable data. It is hardly surprising that a scrupulous respect for these precepts in the study of morality would lead to barren results.

When we come to consider the theory of moral education, it is obvious that the situation is even more complicated than for the theory of morality as such. In addition to the latter theory, we must now take into account theories of how human beings learn (and specifically how they learn to think and act morally); theories about the content and organization of the curriculum in formal education, how moral education should be fitted into this context and what it should contain; theories about the role of the school as a social institution (e.g. the question of being neutral on moral values that are disputed in the society). Before we can approach the question of curriculum planning intelligently, it is necessary to give some attention to such a range of questions as the following:

- 1 How are we to distinguish moral beliefs, reasons, actions from other kinds of beliefs, reasons, actions? In other words, what is the nature of the moral domain?

- 2 What special connections, if any, does the moral domain have with other aspects of culture and social order (e.g. the arts, religion, law, government)?

- 3 How, if at all, are moral decisions to be justified? More generally how, if at all, is the practice of morality as a whole to be justified?

- 4 What knowledge, dispositions, and skills does one need in order to engage effectively in the practice of morality?

- 5 In what way can and should the school explicitly contribute to moral education? In what way does it (and should it) contribute implicitly to moral education?

- 6 What is known about the influence, both explicit and implicit, of various other institutions in our society (especially family and social class, peer group, mass media)?

- 7 What is known about the experience and capacity of children at different ages that might be relevant to the organization of a

curriculum in moral education?

What I have said about the effort to develop moral theory applies even more obviously to work in the theory of moral education. Even leaving aside issues of curriculum, I do not know of any single work that provides a truly comprehensive theory of moral education. The classical effort in this regard is Emile Durkheim's *Moral Education*.⁵⁵ But despite its range and the attention it gives to philosophical issues, it is clearly partial in the aspects of morality it emphasizes and in the predominance of the sociological perspective from which morality and education are interpreted. Certainly, in the last decade or so, exponents of anything like a general theory of moral education have tended to speak mainly from a psychological or sociological or philosophical point of view. In discussing theories of moral education, I shall refer mainly to a number of writers who have been concerned with a general theory of education from one or another of these perspectives. Piecemeal empirical studies of moral education, on which I shall not comment directly, have usually suffered from the same limitations of methodology as similar work on the practice of morality as such, aggravated by the addition of the educational dimension.

Any chance of developing a comprehensive theory of moral education — one that took account of the complexity of moral practice, the range of theoretical perspectives from which it may be understood, and all the related aspects of educational theory — would seem to depend on the co-ordinated effort of a team of experts. As I mentioned earlier in relation to moral theory as such, in the interdisciplinary task of forming a fully adequate theory of moral education, the integrating mode of thought would be philosophical. Before proceeding to discuss contributions to a general theory of moral education from various disciplinary perspectives, I shall comment on one team project undertaken in the past ten years or so that seemed to have the potential for the kind of approach to which I have referred.

**John Wilson, Norman Williams, and Barry Sugarman:
*An Interdisciplinary Theory?***

Known as the Farmington Trust Group, it was established at Oxford in 1965 and continued until 1972. The members of the team con-

sisted of John Wilson (philosopher), Norman Williams (psychologist), and Barry Sugarman (sociologist). In their various publications, whether as collaborating or separate authors, they have written in a clear and constructive way on the nature of moral education. I wish to refer here to their principal joint work, *Introduction to Moral Education*.³⁶ It consists of three main parts: the first, written by John Wilson and occupying about half the book, examines a broad range of philosophical issues on the nature of morality and moral education; the second part provides a succinct survey of the relevant psychological and sociological theories (the former by Williams, the latter by Sugarman); the final part — again the author is Wilson — makes a number of useful, although summarily stated, suggestions for the school's engagement in moral education.

This book does, I believe, provide a reasonably good indication (perhaps better than any others available) of the scope of questions and theoretical perspectives that relate to the practice of moral education. However it does not exemplify what I was referring to as a comprehensive theory of moral education. The range of contributing disciplines is inadequate (anthropology, for example, has not been included); the aspects of understanding that each discipline can provide have not been worked into an integrated pattern; the philosophical dimension is not simply given prominence, but is overwhelming. In fact, the book really illustrates the attempt to develop a general theory of moral education from one theoretical perspective (in this case, philosophical) with borrowing from certain others (in this case, psychological and sociological).

The strengths and weaknesses of the theory offered are largely those of Wilson's moral philosophy. Although it is somewhat eclectic, it essentially reflects R. M. Hare's theory.³⁷ Thus it bears most of the key characteristics of the style of moral philosophy that, as we saw in the previous chapter, has recently been challenged. In particular, it will be noticed that Wilson (i) identifies what counts as a *moral* reason, etc., in terms of the formal criteria proposed by Hare, and thus independently of any condition of content, (ii) adopts the unitary deductive account of moral argument that is an integral part of Hare's theory, and (iii) assumes that the method of linguistic analysis in moral philosophy preserves neutrality in relation to diverse moral systems (he is so blinkered by his own approach that

at one stage he refers to 'the neutral and liberal picture of morality and moral education I have painted').³⁸

In elaborating a theory of moral education, Wilson focuses on the notion of rationality. He argues that the general objective of education is to develop rationality in all its main forms. Hence, to determine the scope of moral education, it is necessary to know what distinguishes rationality in the moral sphere and what conditions facilitate its exercise. Wilson is mainly concerned with morality as it involves interpersonal relationships. In this area, the distinctive conditions for rational thought and action in morality are that the reasons one has for acting should (i) satisfy the necessary formal criteria and (ii) relate to the feelings and interests of other people (what Wilson calls a procedural principle). If a reason satisfies the formal criteria but not the procedural principle, it is considered by Wilson to be of a moral kind but irrational. Given that a person is learning to meet these conditions of rationality in the moral sphere (and others that are common to thought and action generally), what values he chooses to live by or what the content of his moral judgments or actions may be does not come within the scope of moral education. Its task is to promote whatever skills, attitudes, and factual knowledge are involved in employing methods of rational thought in the practice of morality.

I do not wish to engage in a systematic and detailed criticism of Wilson's position in *Introduction to Moral Education*. In several crucial respects, as I have indicated, it is subject to the general criticisms discussed in the last chapter. The only additional points I would make are these:

1 We may agree that morality can and should be rational and that one of the school's special functions in moral education is to develop rational thought and action. This does not commit us, however, to accepting Wilson's version of rational judgment. Apart from the tendency to impose one logical model on moral thought, he interprets the notion of rationality far too broadly. It is arbitrary to suggest that a person who, through lack of sympathetic imagination, misunderstands the feelings of others is being irrational. Even in regard to the basic procedural condition, a person who decides what he ought to do for reasons that he believes override consideration of people's feelings and interests can hardly be said to act irrationally.

Within Wilson's scheme, it would seem more appropriate to claim that such a person acted rationally (if he observed the formal criteria) but immorally because he did not treat reasons related to the interests and feelings of those affected by his action as overriding. This would, of course, involve the recognition of conditions of content in what one might legitimately choose as a moral reason.

2 While people's interests and feelings are, no doubt, relevant considerations in making a moral judgment, it is at least arguable whether they should be treated as (rationally or morally) overriding. Certainly in individual cases, the feelings and interests people have must themselves be morally evaluated. If it is asserted that the general purpose of morality is to maximize human interests (or any other version of the utilitarian good), we come back to the question of whether morality as a whole may strictly be said to have any purpose and, if so, whether it may justifiably be constrained to a single purpose.

Despite what I take to be basic flaws in Wilson's position, there is still much of value in what he proposes. He makes a strong case, for example, against the tendency to reduce morality to behaviour, and moral education to behavioural conditioning. (Even here he has difficulties because he is working in a tradition in which, as Murdoch complains, all the moral knowledge one may be said to have is strictly impersonal and closely tied to behavioural evidence.) It is also a positive feature of his theory that while stressing rationality he also recognizes the crucial role of feelings and attitudes in moral thought and action.

Most of the practical suggestions for moral education in the final part of the book do not depend for their value on the theory for which Wilson argues. However, the background theory would inevitably make a crucial difference in translating at least some of these suggestions into practice. Wilson's general moral theory leads to certain conclusions about the characteristics of a morally educated person. These mark out what he takes to be the main objectives and scope of a moral education program.³⁰ I think the list clearly illustrates the difference one's interpretation or theory of morality makes for the practice of moral education. There may be fairly general agreement on most of the components that Wilson proposes, at least as expressed in summary form. However, apart from the profound

differences that would emerge when these were formulated in detail, there would be dispute, for example, over the emphasis placed on the ability to form our own principles of behaviour (it is one thing to adopt moral principles reflectively and with understanding, it is another thing to decide for oneself what will count as a moral principle); and there would be serious objection to the omission of any reference to the acquisition and development of our knowledge of substantial moral concepts and the general fostering of moral character of which this knowledge is an integral part.

In summary (and acknowledging that much more might be said for and against Wilson's view of moral education), I would stress (i) that he is proposing only one interpretation of what it is to be rational in morality and not necessarily the most satisfactory, and (ii) that, even though moral education should help us to be rational in morality, there is more to morality than being rational in judgment and action, and possibly more to moral education.

4 : THEORY OF MORAL EDUCATION: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

During the past decade or so there has been a large volume of psychological work on moral behaviour and development. While much of it is indirectly related to moral education as a task of the school, relatively little has been concerned immediately with this topic, and only a few psychologists have tried to present anything like a general theory of moral education (or moral development more broadly, for that matter). Among work of this kind, I doubt whether there would be much dispute over the claim that Lawrence Kohlberg's is the most interesting and influential.

As Martin Hoffman points out,⁴⁰ three broadly philosophical doctrines about the nature of man as a moral being are reflected in the main psychological theories of morality that have emerged during the present century. Freud and the psychoanalytic school reflect a modified secular version of the doctrine of original sin: that man is innately disposed to evil. They interpret morality as being fundamentally concerned with the repression of anti-social impulses. Guilt has been one of their major topics of research. Piaget and his followers tend to support the view of man as innately good. One comes to moral maturity largely through the exercise of one's developing cognitive capacities. The focus of attention in this approach has been on the cognitive aspects of morality, especially moral judgment. The proponents of the various forms of stimulus-response learning theory are heirs to the belief that man is not innately good or evil. The direction he takes depends on how he is conditioned. Naturally these theorists have concentrated on the use of positive and negative reinforcement in the learning of behaviour related to a society's moral standards.

Two very useful reviews of the psychological study of morality have been published during the past ten years. The first is the chapter entitled, Moral Development, by Martin Hoffman in *Carmichael's Manual of Child Psychology*. It covers almost 100 pages and provides a comprehensive and fairly detailed examination of findings

and methods of psychological research into the processes of moral development. It deals mainly, but not exclusively, with work done during the 1960s in the United States. The second of these reviews is *The Psychology of Moral Behaviour* by Derek Wright.⁴¹ As the title suggests, it is somewhat more general in its scope, and it focuses more directly on a number of key themes (e.g. delinquency, altruism, character) in the light of psychological research rather than on the characteristics of the research itself. One chapter comments directly on moral education. As with the other review, most of the work to which Wright refers was published in the 1960s, although it is geographically a little more inclusive.

In the course of his review Hoffman emphasizes two major and often related aspects of what might be called moral education in the broad sense: the imitation of models and the exercise of discipline. While these aspects are not peculiarly related to the school's role in moral education, I believe they must form an integral part of it. In a general way, all societies have recognized the power of example and the common human tendency to identify with and imitate people who play a key role in their lives. Every culture has its moral heroes and villains. Hoffman suggests that, although the processes of imitation have been studied intensively in the past few years, there is need for further work — especially on the influence that models of morally good action exert (particularly relevant, one would hope, to the role of the teacher).

On the question of discipline, Hoffman examines research findings in relation to three main forms: power assertion, love withdrawal, and induction (where a child is given reasons for what he is required to do or refrain from doing). The three forms may be combined in various ways. The main conclusion Hoffman has drawn from his own research is that 'moral development is associated positively with induction and affection and negatively with power assertion'.⁴² The induction form of discipline — when the reasons given refer to the consequences of an action for other people — plays an important role in the eventual development of a personally reflective morality. Hoffman relates its effectiveness to the capacity for empathy in young children which is manifested well before they acquire moral controls.

At the conclusion of his review, Hoffman raises the question whether moral development is a unitary process. Freudian and Piage-

tian theorists interpret it in this way; behaviourists regard it simply as an example of discrimination training through positive and negative reinforcement. Hoffman's own conclusion is that 'moral development is a multifaceted phenomenon to which several different processes appear to contribute'.⁴³ He suggests that four main tracks should be distinguished:

1 *Behaviour conformity.* It begins as the adoption of relatively specific responses appropriate to what is rewarded as good, and punished as bad. With conceptual development, the pattern of responses can become more generalized. Morality adopted in this way is essentially external, with pleasure and pain being the basic motives.

2 *The perception of authority and moral rules as rational.* This change depends on cognitive development. It is facilitated by contact with people who exercise authority rationally, and by taking some part in the exercising of authority oneself (e.g. participating in decisions on one's behaviour at home, making rules for a game). Moral requirements come to be accepted because they are believed to be legitimate.

3 *The control of impulses towards antisocial behaviour through the development of anxiety or anticipated guilt at their occurrence.* The practice by which adults express or withhold love depending on how a child behaves has a strong influence on the development of these feelings.

4 *The acquisition of positive pro-social attitudes, built on the basis of the child's capacity for empathy.*

These 'tracks' do not seem to make up anything like a comprehensive map of moral development. In fact, they probably reflect the directions that psychological research just happens to have taken. But they include at least some reference to behaviour, feelings, attitudes, and cognition, and it will be useful to have them in mind in discussing Kohlberg's preoccupation with cognitive processes. Hoffman makes the important observation that most psychological research into morality has concentrated on either the cognitive determinants of the cognitive aspects or the emotional determinants of the emotional aspects. The ways in which each acts upon the other in moral development have been neglected and should be given priority, he suggests, on the agenda of future research.

Lawrence Kohlberg: Invariant Developmental Stages of Moral Judgment

As I have already suggested, the major recent contribution by a psychologist to a general theory of moral education has been made by Lawrence Kohlberg.⁴⁴ I shall not attempt to comment on every facet of his theory and the complex issues that it raises. In order to provide a critical introduction to his writings, I shall first refer briefly to some background influences, then discuss the most salient features of his theory of moral development, and finally comment, in a little more detail, on his view of moral education and the role of the school.

In his general theoretical position and his method of studying moral development, Kohlberg is a disciple of Jean Piaget. That is, he is preoccupied with cognitive processes and accepts the 'structural-developmental' theory according to which there are definite ordered stages in the emergence of mental capacities. These stages arise through the interaction of the organism and its social and physical environment. Each stage is a more adequate way of organizing experience, and the whole process is said to be self-constructive and self-regulative.

From his study of children's responses to simple stories that call for a moral judgment and their answers to direct questions on moral issues, Piaget concluded that, following a strictly pre-moral stage, children develop through two stages of morality: the heteronomous and the autonomous.⁴⁵ In the former, rules are treated as absolute, responsibility is determined exclusively in terms of the consequences, and fairness is interpreted arithmetically. In the latter, rules are seen as instruments of co-operation mutually accepted, the intentions of the agent become crucial in assigning responsibility, and fairness is interpreted proportionately. Although Kohlberg's account of the development of moral judgment differs in substantial ways from that of Piaget, his work constitutes an elaboration and refinement of the latter's theory and method.

Kohlberg has also been strongly influenced by Dewey. In moral education specifically, Dewey emphasized the learning of appropriate ways of thinking and judging, and proposed three levels of moral development: the pre-social, in which biological and social impulses shape behaviour; the conventional, in which the individual accepts

group standards, but in a largely unreflective way; the autonomous, in which the individual judges for himself and accepts group standards only after critical reflection.

Like Piaget, Kohlberg's ethical theory is predominantly Kantian.⁴⁶ The moral 'ought' is a categorical imperative, the test of a moral principle is the formal condition that it can, without inconsistency, be applied universally, and the moral agent is autonomous or sovereign in that he legislates the principles of morality to himself. Kohlberg seems to have adopted these features through the interpretation given them in R. M. Hare whose influence on Wilson has already been noted. In particular, Kohlberg follows Hare (as Wilson does) in asserting that the moral character of a judgment is to be distinguished by strictly formal criteria without any limitation of content. In his account of the principles of justice, Kohlberg relies heavily on John Rawls's broadly Kantian non-utilitarian interpretation in which the principles are formal and universal, and justified as the principles that rational beings in a pre-social original position would agree in advance to accept (a version of the social contract theory).⁴⁷ On the ultimate question of why a person should be just or moral, Dewey's influence is again apparent. At this level, Kohlberg supports Dewey's scientific instrumental evaluation of morality in relation to personal and social welfare and growth.⁴⁸

The theory of moral development

Kohlberg's study of the development of moral reasoning began with his doctoral thesis, completed in 1958. Since then, both as a single and a joint author, he has publicized his findings and theory in a large number of articles. During the past few years very little seems to have been added to the empirical findings; the incremental variations are found mainly in relation to philosophical issues and aspects of moral education.

The subjects in the original study were 75 boys between 10 and 16 years of age. Since that time, the group has been tested at three-yearly intervals. Partial replications have been done in a number of different cultures, and experiments have been conducted by Kohlberg and various colleagues, particularly on changing an individual's level of moral reasoning and on the relationship between moral thought and action.⁴⁹

The method used in the main studies is an elaboration of the one used by Piaget. It consists in presenting the subject with a series of ten stories each containing a moral dilemma, asking them what they would do if they were in such a situation and why (in all, a two-hour interview), and then classifying their responses in terms of the *kinds* of moral reasons they gave.⁵⁰ For this purpose, Kohlberg developed a schema consisting of 30 aspects of morality that might be reflected in the reasons given and a scale of six types of reasons that might be given for any one aspect. Usually a person's moral reasoning is not all of one type; he is placed according to the predominant kind of moral reasons he uses over the broad range of moral aspects and issues. Kohlberg emphasizes that a person's classification is not determined by the solution he offers to the dilemmas, but the kind of reasons he has for his decisions.

Kohlberg claims to have found evidence for a developmental sequence of six stages of moral reasoning along which human beings progress in an invariant order. He also asserts, incidentally, that the order is a logically necessary one. In summary, Kohlberg's six stages are as follows:

- 1 Avoidance of punishment and deference to superior power.
- 2 Simple instrumental hedonism; decisions made on the basis of pleasure and immediate reward; reciprocity for the sake of personal advantage.
- 3 Maintaining good relations with others, and deciding on the basis of what will win approval.
- 4 Moral decisions based on respect for authority, the acceptance of fixed rules, and the maintenance of social order.
- 5 Moral decisions based on the notion of a social contract, individual rights, and standards agreed upon by the whole society.
- 6 Moral decisions of personal conscience in accordance with self-chosen universal ethical principles.

Kohlberg groups the six stages in three levels: the first two belong to pre-conventional morality, the third and fourth characterize conventional morality, and the fifth and sixth form the level of principled or autonomous morality. It is obvious that Kohlberg's three levels correspond closely to those identified by Dewey. According to Kohlberg, Piaget's heteronomous and autonomous stages are roughly

equivalent to his stages 1 and 2 (i.e. within the pre-conventional level).⁵¹

On the basis of his own longitudinal and cross-cultural studies and various experiments carried out by his colleagues, Kohlberg has reached a number of conclusions that are clearly of significance for ethics and moral education. The most important of these may be summarized in the following way:

1 As I have already mentioned, Kohlberg claims to have discovered that, in fact, there are six stages or comprehensive ways of thinking about moral questions in the development of human beings from childhood to maturity. The stages are not distinguished in terms of moral content but by virtue of the form of moral reasoning employed.

2 The sequence of stages is the same among human beings everywhere.

3 Each stage is not only more conceptually sophisticated than the one before it, but more adequate from a moral point of view. That is, it is morally preferable for a person to be making moral judgments at stage 5 rather than stage 4, and best of all if they are of the stage 6 variety.

4 There is an invariant progression through the stages. No one can move to a stage that is two above his present level without going through the intervening stage; and no one, having achieved a particular stage, regresses to an earlier one. Of course, 'being at a stage' does not exclude some elements of the style of moral thought that is typical of other stages (especially those immediately below and above).

5 The only significant differences among human beings in relation to the stages of moral thought is the rate at which they develop and the level they attain. For example, rural children generally progress more slowly than city children. As might be expected, intellectual ability and development are positively correlated with a person's stage of moral reasoning. On this matter, Kohlberg insists that superior IQ and conceptual abilities, while necessary, are not sufficient conditions for attaining the higher stages of moral thought. It seems, incidentally, that a large proportion of people do not get beyond stage 3 or 4.⁵²

For moral education, perhaps the most important explanatory

aspect of Kohlberg's moral theory relates to the question of how transition from one stage to another occurs. What he offers is an application of the general developmental theory. In relation to intellectual development, the theory describes the interaction of the human organism and its environment in terms of two basic processes: the assimilation of what is experienced to the existing mental schema and the accommodation of this schema to what is given in experience. To be at a stage of cognitive or moral development is to have achieved a relatively stable equilibrium between assimilation and accommodation. It is a basic principle of the theory that all behaviour tends towards this equilibrium. Thus, when the stage of moral reasoning a person is at can no longer maintain equilibrium in his relationship with his social environment, he restructures his form of moral thought until a new level of equilibrium is achieved. Each stage in Kohlberg's series is a more equilibrated way of dealing with moral issues than the one before it. Given that this explanation is accepted, progression through the stages of moral reasoning is likely to be promoted through novelty, diversity, and conflict in one's social experience.

Kohlberg's theory of moral development raises a complex range of questions in relation to the research method, the interpretation of the nature of morality that it embodies, and the underlying cognitive theory. I shall attempt to do no more than indicate the objections that can be raised, particularly to the moral theory.⁵³

In relation to methods of research, one of the main problems that has been pointed out concerns reliability in the classification of subjects' moral reasons. On this issue, Kurtines and Greif — in an article that illustrates well the kinds of criticism that can be made of Kohlberg's research — conclude: 'After 15 years of research with the Moral Judgement Scale, there are *no* reliability estimates for the scale itself'.⁵⁴

In its general style, the ethical theory supported by Kohlberg displays the key features that were discussed in the first section of the essay. The criticisms set out there — particularly of the attempt to distinguish moral principles by means of purely formal criteria — apply also to Kohlberg. In regard to his work more specifically, I would stress the following points:

- 1 Kohlberg's theory seems to provide a scheme for promoting

increasingly sophisticated forms of moral reasoning without taking a stand on questions of content or the claims of different moral systems. If this were so, it would be an appealing feature of his theory for schools in a pluralistic society. Unfortunately such neutrality in Kohlberg's scheme is only an illusion. The six stages are not distinct forms of reasoning as, for example, are the stages of concrete and formal operations in Piaget's general theory. Questions of content (e.g. the relative weight given to different moral values) enter into the determination of the stage at which a reason is placed. Kohlberg himself is ambivalent on the distinction between form and content in depicting the stages of moral thought. He claims to define morality 'in terms of the formal characteristics of a moral judgement or a moral point of view rather than in terms of its content'. But he insists that 'social content must in addition be considered'.⁵⁵

More generally, Kohlberg's stages embody an evaluation of the relative moral merits of several conflicting theories. Utilitarian and theistic interpretations of morality fall short of stage 6 and so are morally inferior. Not only is Kohlberg's view of morality, as essentially a matter of justice, a key point of difference with certain other moral systems, but his interpretation of justice (following Rawls) is a disputed one. As R. S. Peters has observed, Kohlberg 'suffers from the rather touching belief that a Kantian type of morality, represented in modern times most notably by Hare and Rawls, is the only one'.⁵⁶

2 Perhaps the most serious general weakness in Kohlberg's ethical theory is his enthusiasm for a monistic interpretation of the moral domain. It is evident from a number of points of view: he assumes a single pattern to which all reasons and judgments in the vastly complex field of morality must conform; thought in moral practice is treated exclusively as a process of consciously arguing to a decision in the face of conflicting claims; all moral issues are seen as ultimately questions of justice; the whole of morality serves the one purpose of promoting welfare. What Kohlberg's stages represent, in effect, is a developmental sequence in the understanding of justice (interpreted in a particular way) as reflected in the attempt to resolve conflicting claims.

Moral education and the role of the school

According to Kohlberg, the proper and only role of the school in deliberate moral education is the development of moral reasoning and judgment. His conclusion is based on the following claims: (i) Moral judgment is the single most important influential factor determining moral action; consistency between judgment and action increases with the stage of a person's moral reasoning. (ii) Moral judgment is the only distinctively moral factor that influences the shape of moral action. (iii) Unlike behavioural training, the attainment of a higher stage of reasoning is broad in application and irreversible. (iv) By concentrating on the ways in which children and adolescents reason about moral issues rather than on what they believe, the school avoids the indoctrinatory effects of character training on the one hand, and the incompleteness of the values clarification approach on the other.⁵⁷

The basic method of formal moral education consists in group discussion of moral problems. In terms of the general theory of cognitive equilibrium referred to earlier, it is necessary that a child in the course of discussing moral issues should be confronted with reasons that are predominantly one stage above his own level. It is the teacher's task to ensure that each child receives the appropriate 'cognitive stimulation'. The method of discussing moral problems may be pursued directly or in the context of various subjects of the curriculum. Kohlberg has stressed, in particular, the use of English and social studies for this purpose.

In addition to restricting the role of the school to the development of moral judgment, Kohlberg also believes that state schools should concentrate on what he takes to be the only values that are strictly moral and universal: human rights and principles of justice.⁵⁸

Along with moral discussion in the formal curriculum, Kohlberg stresses the crucial importance of the moral character of the general school environment. In his own words,

to extend classroom discussions of justice to real life is to deal with issues of justice in the schools. Education for justice, then, requires making schools more just, and encouraging students to take an active role in making the school more just.⁵⁹

In recent years, Kohlberg and colleagues have experimented with what he calls 'a just community school' within several state schools. Democratic participation in the issues of justice that arise in the life

of the school group (e.g. grading, stealing, drug-taking, problems of discipline) is seen as a moral education that complements the more formal intellectual work of moral education in the curriculum.

In introducing some critical comments on Kohlberg's theory of moral education, I acknowledge that, in so far as the school has a special concern with the use of reason in morality, his work offers valuable insights into the changing capacities of children and adolescents for moral argument. Without necessarily accepting the specific interpretation of morality reflected in Kohlberg's scale, one may employ it as a guide to the kinds of reasoning and justification that are feasible at a given time in helping children towards a principled reflective morality.

However, it does not seem to me that his scheme is satisfactory as a comprehensive blueprint for moral education. The weaknesses are largely those of the underlying theory on the nature of morality and moral development. The whole enterprise of moral education is far too narrowly conceived. Not only is it restricted to reasoning, but to reasoning about dilemmas and to issues of justice.

While reasons and reasoning are no doubt of crucial concern to the school in moral education, there are other indispensable aspects to which the school can contribute: the development of sympathetic imagination, the acquisition of the motives and attitudes one needs in order carefully to apply one's reasoning abilities and knowledge to moral questions, and the learning of 'executive' capacities and dispositions for carrying one's decisions into action, particularly in the face of counter-inclinations. Probably the most basic flaw in Kohlberg's attempt to focus the attention of the school exclusively on moral argument is that the nature and point of such argument can hardly be intelligible once it has been detached from the complex context of beliefs, rules, ideals, attitudes, feelings, dispositions, and practices that make up the moral domain. This leads to an even more serious dislocation than occurs in a number of recent programs in other parts of the curriculum that have advocated the learning of various modes of inquiry without regard for the systematic body of beliefs and theories that has been developed by, and in turn modifies, such inquiry.

Not the least difficulty for Kohlberg's account of moral education is his own claim that the majority of people do not get beyond

stage 3 or 4. Assuming that teachers are not significantly different in this respect from the population generally, one wonders how effectively the schools, in Kohlberg's terms, can foster principled morality or reflect it in their institutional arrangements. Perhaps his theory leads logically to a kind of Platonic scheme in which the social institutions are guided (in a democratic fashion, no doubt) by the stage 5 and 6 elite.

5 : THEORY OF MORAL EDUCATION: THE SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

The Background in Durkheim

I referred earlier to the classical sociological work on a general theory of moral education by Emile Durkheim.⁶⁰ It was first prepared as a series of lectures in 1902-03 and was eventually published as a book in 1925. Although there have been other important sociological studies of morality which bear at least indirectly on moral education, Durkheim's is still, I believe, the only one in which moral education is treated directly and in a systematic comprehensive fashion. Certainly no significant work on this scale has been done from a sociological perspective during the past decade.

In Durkheim's scheme society is envisaged as a kind of super-person ('a new personality distinct from individual personalities');⁶¹ it is at once the ultimate moral authority determining duty and the embodiment of the ideal of moral good. For Durkheim, the whole practice of schooling has a fundamentally moral purpose in that it exists to secure the survival of the society. In the more specific task of moral education, the school stands in an intermediate position between the child's experience of family life and his entry into the general life of the adult society. It plays a crucial part in relation to what Durkheim distinguishes as the three main elements of morality. First, through the experience of discipline in the miniature society of a school, children acquire a sense of the moral discipline, with its impersonal authority and demands of duty, that is necessary in the life of the society as a whole. Secondly, through both formal teaching (e.g. in history) and the experience that living in the institution of the school provides (e.g. identifying with a class group), children are led to an altruistic attachment to the society as a collective entity that transcends the individuals who compose it. Thirdly, through a direct study of the moral order (which, according to Durkheim, could most effectively be done through sociology), an understanding of how the moral order is founded in the nature of society is gradually developed, and it is in this understanding that personal autonomy, the

third main element of morality, consists. ('We liberate ourselves through understanding; there is no other means of liberation. Science is the well-spring of our autonomy.')

Durkheim recognized that traditional morality simply shorn of its religious aspects left modern man with a very shaky theory of morality. In trying to provide a satisfactory alternative to religious morality, Durkheim's basic move was to put his reified notion of society in the place of God.⁶³ The sociologists were thus cast in the role of secular theologians and moralists to the post-Christian age. Despite the admirable coherence of his theory of moral education and the insights of detail it contains, Durkheim in effect provides a blueprint for moral education in a totalitarian society.

Robert Dreeben: *Institutional Properties and the Learning of Values*

From the brief sketch I have given of his theory it is evident that, although moral education is to be achieved partly through the formal curriculum, it depends substantially in Durkheim's view on the informal influence of teachers and peers and on the features of the school's mode of organization. Although the past decade or so has given us nothing in the sociology of moral education that is comparable to Kohlberg's amplification of Piaget's seminal theory, there has been considerable interest in the way the organization of the school (the hidden or unwritten curriculum) shapes moral beliefs and attitudes.⁶⁴ A good illustration of this interest in a sociologist who is clearly Durkheimian in outlook can be seen in Robert Dreeben's *On What is Learned in School*.⁶⁵

Dreeben examines the ways in which the school, through structural properties that differ markedly from those of the family, helps the child to acquire certain norms of conduct crucial for an industrial economy and democratic political order. He draws attention, for example, to the obviously important differences in the size of family and school, the different kinds of relationship children have with adults and one another in the two settings, and the ways in which the pattern of common and specific features among children of a family differs significantly from the pattern that exists among the children of a school class. Related to the structural properties, there are fundamental variations in the forms of conduct between the family and

the school, particularly in the expression of affection and the methods of sanctioning.

Dreeben claims that there are four basic norms (i.e. principles or standards of how individuals ought to act in specific circumstances) that the school by virtue of its structural properties, and quite apart from any explicit didactic effort, is likely to inculcate. The family alone is far less likely to be effective in this task; and, although other institutions might be adapted or devised for the purpose, the school is in fact the main agency through which this learning occurs. The social norms Dreeben distinguishes are those of independence (doing things for oneself and taking personal responsibility); achievement (performing tasks as well as possible in the light of standards of excellence); universalism (seeing people as members of various categories and treating people in the same category as equal); specificity (relating to people under selective aspects). To illustrate the kind of influence from the school institution, that Dreeben has in mind: independence, he suggests, is fostered by such factors as the breaking down of family dependence through attending school, the size of the class group, the strictures on cheating, and the practice of individual testing.

While the case Dreeben makes for the role of the school in developing the norms he distinguishes is persuasive, it raises some questions about the general influence of the unwritten curriculum on the learning of values and the relationship this has to moral education.⁶⁶

1 There is the question of the effectiveness of the structural properties of the school in shaping values. Dreeben himself argues cautiously on this issue. What he claims is that, in their present organization, schools provide opportunities that are favourable to the learning of the four norms. Some students may be provoked to adopt the contrary values, others may not be affected one way or the other. His claim is based on some indirect evidence from studies of socialization and on the plausibility of his analysis of the organization of schooling and the social norms. To anticipate a later point, what counts as effective in this context depends on our criteria of what is acceptable as 'learning a moral principle'. In a later article, Dreeben has summed up the situation in this way: 'Regrettably, there is not a scintilla of evidence either for the strength of the effects of this

latent curriculum or for the mechanisms by which it works'.⁶⁷ He reaches the same qualified conclusion as in his book, but is somewhat more emphatic on the point that we have no reason to suppose the unwritten curriculum holds the secret to the acquisition of the general standards of moral conduct.⁶⁸

2 The influence of the structural properties of the school is examined by Dreeben independently of any effort at explicit teaching in relation to the four basic norms. It would seem important to know what differences the latter might make to what and how children learn from the unwritten curriculum. On the general question of the relative effectiveness of explicit teaching and the unwritten curriculum, Dreeben's own opinion seems to have been modified. In an article containing an earlier version of a section of his book, he claimed that 'what children learn derives as much from the nature of their experience in the school setting as from what they are taught'.⁶⁹ In the book he does not commit himself on a comparison. In the article referred to above, he concludes that while there is reason to believe that direct teaching can bring about some change in values, the unwritten curriculum will not necessarily effect any change. It is unfortunate, as Dreeben notes, that reference to the unwritten (or more sinister sounding 'hidden') curriculum has become such a common part of educational polemics. Obviously the whole question is in need of careful detailed study.

3 The most important question for our purpose is whether the influence of school experience on the acquisition of the four norms, as suggested by Dreeben, is commendable as moral education. Dreeben tries to avoid this question by adopting a value-neutral approach. All he is arguing, he says, is that the school is organized in a way that facilitates the learning of certain standards of conduct that help a democratic polity and industrial economy such as the United States to operate effectively. Although the move would be surprising, he could insist that he is not committing himself on whether it is desirable to maintain the kind of political and economic order one finds in the United States. But when he describes what he means by 'effective operation' — for example disputes settled in a reasonable time, political power transferred without violence — it is obvious that Dreeben must think it is desirable for the school to promote the norms of conduct that are thought to contribute to such a state of

affairs. Although Dreeben, then, clearly believes the norms are moral standards, are they really such? For example, might they not be technical rules of the form, 'if one is to fit into contemporary industrial society, one should acquire the skills of being independent, etc.'? From Dreeben's vague description of the norms (particularly universalism and specificity), there is reason to doubt whether they are strictly moral principles. In terms of a theory of moral education, it is thus a serious weakness of Dreeben's work that it lacks any adequate defence of his assumptions about the moral character of the four norms. In the sociological tradition derived from Durkheim, the status quo of the social order simply is taken as the decisive criterion of the values that should be transmitted by the school. The same kind of conservatism is reflected, for example, in Barry Sugarman. But the political and economic arrangements of a society should themselves be subject to moral scrutiny, and this should at some point form part of moral education.

Apart from the content of the norms, one may question whether the manner in which they are said to be learnt is educationally and morally satisfactory. To claim that a child learns a norm could mean anything from a subtle form of conditioning, in which behavioural conformity is achieved without any conceptual grasp of the norm, up to a clear understanding of what the norm is, what kind of norm it is, how it is justified, and how it may be applied and acted upon with due regard for varying circumstances. Durkheim does not seem to have given attention to this issue. If the transmission of the norms occurs independently of any formal teaching and learning, as Dreeben assumes, it is likely that they would be acquired in an unreflective way. What, for example, does a student learn about independence simply from the proscription of cheating? Obviously, if an individual's acquired skills are being tested, the proscription does reinforce 'acting independently' in the literal sense of doing work on one's own. But cheating is wrong not because the individual does not act independently but because, in the circumstances, he acts deceitfully. It does not seem that the proscription of cheating, either in intention or in fact, encourages acting independently in the sense of acting on principle, thinking for oneself, not being swayed by popular opinion, etc. Frequently examinations, even when the rule against cheating is being scrupulously observed, are an exercise in the very

opposite of this ideal.

While it is important to values are being inculcated organization, such knowledge education only when the ce which they are being learnt educational criteria. nize as clearly as possible what gh the school's actual pattern of assimilated to a theory of moral of the values and the manner in praised in the light of moral and

William Kay: Social Class

A recent example of a fairly tion from a sociological per tion (1975).⁷⁰ I do not beli I mention it here because stantial body of sociologic education. It also has the n together in the context of a

I shall comment only br al view of moral education. is particularly interested in the substance of the book. Kay morality and in the ways relation between social class and affects moral development. h the school as a social system primary moral traits.⁷¹ In re argument he distinguishes five sociological evidence show to these traits he claims that the morally more mature than t the middle class as a group is not to any innate superiorit king class. This is due, he stresses, life — in the one case facilito differences in the conditions of development of moral matu and in the other case inhibiting the exercise a reforming role ay believes that the school should compensate for the failure ety. In moral education, it must for morality and the primarylies to develop the preconditions the school to reflect and in traits. He claims that this requires style for the benefit of all c the middle-class values and life-work, the school should h. Beyond the remedial part of its which Kay identifies as aut develop certain moral attitudes sibility and which he relat rationality, altruism, and respon-moral attitude called rationthat he thinks is a new emerging most likely to be effectiveism. He argues that the school is comprehensive in form andwork of moral education if it is zation with that of participnes the pattern of familial organi-emocracy.

It can at least be conceded that in the present climate Kay's thesis on social class and moral education is a courageous one. Despite all the evidence he appeals to so confidently, the notions of social class and morality are so complex that I believe the claim to any simple clear-cut relationship between them must be *prima facie* suspect. One would need to examine carefully the relationship between the features of high-level morality distinguished by Kay and the values that are thought to be part of the defining characteristics of the middle class. It is not finally clear whether he thinks high-level morality can be achieved independently of any particular class or is inextricably linked with the middle class — although he does seem to favour the latter view. It would also be necessary to give attention to the conflicting interpretations of morality that run within and across the lines of social class. In relation to the role of the school, some account should be taken of the many critics, such as Friedenberg, who have raged against the school for imposing what they take to be morally deforming values of middle-class society.

Kay's general interpretation of the nature of morality is rather thin. There is very little systematic argument or development of a theory. What he offers are various lists of key elements, each summarily described. Apart from the rather fanciful talk of a newly emerging 'compound' attitude of rational-altruism, Kay says nothing in detail to elucidate this combination of reason and love.

6 : THEORY OF MORAL EDUCATION: THE PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE

During the present century, ethical theorists have generally not addressed themselves directly to the question of moral education. Perhaps the most notable exception is R. M. Hare.⁷² He has written on the nature of moral education himself and has exercised a strong influence on the work of others (e.g. Kohlberg and Wilson) in this field. Among other ethical theorists who have taken more than a passing interest in moral education are Kurt Baier, Michael Scriven, and Mary Warnock.⁷³

As might be expected, philosophers working systematically within the multi-disciplinary field of education have given special attention to the theory and practice of moral education. In the earlier part of this century the outstanding work of this kind was done by John Dewey.⁷⁴ Because of his work in ethics and in the general theory of education, his knowledge of psychology, and his practical experience, he was extremely well qualified to write on the theory of moral education. In addition to what he wrote specifically about moral education, related themes recur throughout most of his general educational writings. In Dewey's highly integrated scheme, the challenge of moral education is simply part of the general effort of education to link knowledge appropriately with impulses and habits and thus to secure its connection with action; the process of reflective thinking on moral problems is essentially the same as for any other kind of problem. The social character of knowledge, in Dewey's interpretation, closely affiliates it with moral values. In fact, he interprets the moral domain broadly and treats the whole of education as basically directed to the achievement of moral values.

Among philosophers of education who have written broadly on the theory of moral education during the past decade, I have already discussed something of John Wilson's work. A recent book by Paul Hirst, *Moral Education in a Secular Society*,⁷⁵ presents a clearly argued case for a completely secular and rational morality and moral education. The kinds of knowledge, skills, attitudes, and dispositions

that he believes constitute moral education are similar to those included on John Wilson's list. While Hirst acknowledges the complexity of moral development he stresses the core role of the cognitive aspects and the special task of the school in their development. His account of moral education is constructed on the basis of an interesting general argument that the primary aim of the whole practice of education (including, for example, the study of religion) should be the development of rational autonomy and thus should be entirely secular. It is an argument that deserves to be considered seriously by teachers whether in state or religiously-related schools. (Paradoxically, there was a strong tradition in Christian thought that stressed the secular character of education in contrast to the essentially religious interpretation of the Greco-Roman culture.)⁷⁶

R. S. Peters: Moral Education and the Ideal of the Rational Man

Among contemporary philosophers of education, I believe the most distinguished contribution to the theory of moral education has been made by R. S. Peters. Although his writings on education are not as prolific or as wide-ranging or as dramatic in their influence as those of Dewey, he does bear comparison with Dewey for the scope and coherence of his work in educational theory. In Peters also there are issues relevant to moral education discussed in many parts of his writing. I shall restrict my comments here to the more recent of his publications in which moral education is the central theme.

Peters on Kohlberg

A substantial part of Peters's writing on moral education has been related to an assessment of various psychological theorists in this field. His main essays have been collected in *Psychology and Ethical Development*.⁷⁷ The essays on moral development deal particularly with Freud, Piaget, and Kohlberg.

The treatment of Kohlberg (in the above book and elsewhere) is particularly important as a critique, and also as a reflection of Peters's own views. Although he accepts the developmental sequence that Kohlberg has described and agrees in general with the picture of the fully moral person given in stage 6, he has pointed out a number of serious weaknesses in Kohlberg's theory of morality and moral education. In particular he criticizes Kohlberg for interpreting the

complex nature of morality in terms of a single aspect, for neglecting the role of the emotions related to morality (e.g. compassion, guilt), and for disregarding the place of content and the development of virtues in moral education.

In relation to virtues, Peters points out that the assent to principles such as those of justice is not sufficient for living as a moral agent; one also needs dispositions to apply such principles and to act on them in the face of counter-inclinations. The way in which these dispositions are learnt is clearly different from coming to know and accept a general moral principle. Peters also criticizes Kohlberg's assumption that all virtues are of the same type.⁷⁸ Kohlberg has not noticed that the Hartshorne and May experiments — to which he appeals in support of the claim that training in virtues does not generalize — focused mainly on one type of virtue: those that are, or can be, simply habits concerned with a relatively specific range of action and that do not, of themselves, provide motives for these actions (e.g. tidiness, punctuality, aspects of honesty). Peters argues that there are at least three other types: those that are also motives for action (e.g. compassion), those that are artificial in the sense that they depend on institutional arrangements (e.g. justice, tolerance), and those that directly involve self-control and are employed in overcoming counter-inclinations (e.g. courage, integrity). Habits or virtues, as Peters emphasizes, need not be acquired merely through mechanical conditioning; they can be informed by reason and exercised reflectively. Even in Kohlberg's own scheme, the notion of a habit or virtue is inescapable: to say that a person is at a given stage (even stage 5 or 6) is to claim that he typically makes moral judgments in a certain way.

Aspects of Peters's ethical theory

The most complete statement of Peters's own interpretation of morality and moral education is contained in *Reason and Compassion*.⁷⁹ At least four major points of emphasis may be distinguished in his theory of morality:

- 1 He frequently stresses the complexity of the moral domain. It is concerned with human wants and the promoting of welfare, duties related to various social roles and offices, rules for conduct between people generally, large-scale goals of life that act as motives, and the

broad traits of character that express the manner in which rules are followed and goals pursued. Peters warns that ethical theories tend to achieve an artificial unity through being preoccupied with only one of these aspects.

2 These complex features can be accommodated, Peters believes, in an account of morality that highlights two formal elements: rational autonomy in the choice and application of moral rules and concern for others. The rational form of morality has emerged only in the relatively recent history of man. The first of its formal features reflects the influence of Stoicism; the second, of Christianity. While there is tension between the two elements, this can be partly resolved in that the exercise of reason involves respect for others and the exercise of love (at least in the Christian tradition) is subject to the guidance of reason.⁸⁰

3 Peters places special stress on the interplay of reason and emotion. Various emotions enter into the use of reason (e.g. love of order, accuracy, impartiality), just as reason has some part in the experience of emotions. Different levels of morality are not distinguished along a dichotomy between reason and emotion, but according to the relative weight given to each. Peters advocates an ideal of the moral life in which the passions involved in a commitment to the tradition of critical rationality hold a central place. It follows that to be liberally educated (i.e. inducted into the tradition of critical rationality) is to be morally educated.⁸¹

4 Among all the aspects of morality, Peters seems to put most emphasis on rules, whether he is referring to the rationally autonomous moral agent or to the conformist.

The nature of moral education

In examining the complicated process of moral education, Peters suggests that there are four main tasks to be accomplished: (i) To teach children from an early age the basic rules of moral conduct. (ii) To develop the 'legislative' function: an understanding of the procedural principles for modifying and revising rules of conduct. (iii) To develop the 'judicial' function: the skills for applying rules to particular situations (entailing the type of character who applies rules in a rational discriminating way). (iv) To develop the 'executive' function: the dispositions necessary for carrying decisions into

action (in general, what is meant by saying that a person 'has character').⁸²

Peters's interpretation of moral education is built up on the distinction between the form and content of morality. He believes that this distinction provides the clue to resolving two basic issues in moral education: how people can be trained in moral habits and yet develop rational autonomy, and the conflicting claims of the methods of instruction and learning by discovery and experience.

In regard to the first element in the form of morality (rational autonomy), Peters seems to endorse fully the Piaget-Kohlberg model of moral stages and their general interpretation of the way children learn principles of rational judgment. A teacher may provide 'cognitive stimulation' but cannot directly instruct anyone in such principles. Peters probably places more value than Kohlberg does on the stage of conforming to rules as absolute. He argues that a person first needs to experience obedience to rules and to gain a sense of their inviolability before being able meaningfully to adopt his own rules.⁸³

Apart from drawing attention to gaps in our understanding of how rational autonomy is acquired (e.g. in relation to the aspects of integrity and strength of will), Peters suggests that initiation into disciplined modes of thought (such as history and literature) and the experience of a rational authority structure in the school play a significant role.

In relation to the second element in the form of morality — concern for others — Peters notes that it lacks an adequate developmental account analogous to that which Piaget and Kohlberg provide for moral reasoning. In his view, how children come to care for others is the most important question in moral education.⁸⁴ He thinks that the key to its development may be found in the quality of a child's early social relationships, as claimed by Freudians and social learning theorists.

On the content of morality, Peters first stresses that it must be given an important place in moral education. Apart from the case of those who are not (or not yet) capable of acting morally in a rationally autonomous way, those who are at this level cannot apply the formal principles of morality (such as considering the interests of others) without reference to a definite content. While rather vague

on what the content of rational morality includes, Peters argues that instruction and various non-rational methods of teaching (e.g. being a model to be imitated, using rewards and punishments) are necessary in the learning of moral content. The crucial principle is that such methods should be used in a way that aids, or at least does not impede, the ultimate emergence of a rationally autonomous moral agent. In this respect, Peters appeals to the psychological evidence in favour of the 'induction' type of discipline (referred to in the fourth section) and of positive rather than negative responses. Approval and affection help to build the kind of self-image on which mature morality depends.

Critical comments

As with the theorists already discussed, I shall not attempt to provide an exhaustive assessment of Peters's interpretation of morality and moral education. While I believe he is mistaken in certain important respects, the views he defends are to a considerable degree ones with which I am sympathetic. The objections I wish to raise probably refer more to obscurities or lack of adequate development in his theory than to what I consider clear mistakes.

1 There are several related issues that arise over the notion of rational morality as Peters defends it.

(a) In various places,⁸⁵ he discusses the objective character of rationality. Clearly he believes that the tradition of critical rationality has universal validity. However, he does not give a very thorough argument in its defence, one that would deal effectively with the relativism and ultimate arbitrariness of the 'forms of life' metaphor (as Peter Winch, for example, has interpreted Wittgenstein's notion) or the positions that Kuhn and Feyerabend seem to take.⁸⁶

(b) One may agree that principles of reason should be applied to morality as to other aspects of life. However, it does not follow that there is the one form (not to mention content) of morality that is distinctively rational. Although Durkheim locates moral authority in a collective conscience, can he be said to be proposing an irrational or even 'arational' form of morality? When societies like the USSR reject the rational autonomous form of morality as 'an aberration of individualistic societies' (to use Peters's words), does this reflect a clash between rational and non-rational views of morality or between

different interpretations of what being rational about morality involves?

(c) In addition to disagreement on what forms of morality qualify as rational, there can be rational debate on the part the principles and procedures of rationality play in the total practice of morality. Mathematics may consist substantially in the exercise of such principles and procedures; the same cannot be said of art or morality. Peters himself is unclear, for example, on what he takes to be the ultimate extent of rational justification in morality. Can we give adequate reasons why one should be concerned for all other people or treat them fairly? On these principles, Peters himself notes that 'it is difficult to see what further reasons could be given. For sensitivity to them is a precondition of there being reasons'.⁸⁷

(d) The weight that Peters places on autonomy is somewhat unclear. Like Piaget and Kohlberg, he thinks the highest form of morality is the one in which a person decides and acts on the basis of principles he has accepted for himself as morally binding. Peters of course stresses that such autonomy is subject to the constraints of rationality. This leads back to the question of what principles a person may rationally accept as moral. Thus, for example, Peters is unwilling to grant that someone who decides he has good reasons for adopting, as a moral principle, always to obey a certain authority is acting with rational autonomy. It seems that, in fact, Peters is advocating a fairly qualified version of moral autonomy: certainly not the Sartrean view or even the one in which a person chooses for himself what are to count as moral principles, provided only that he sincerely bases his choice on what he thinks are good reasons. Peters allows that autonomous morality includes aspects of the conventional form and even of the more primitive form in which considerations of reward and punishment predominate. He even concedes that for rationally autonomous moral agents 'much of their conduct is still regulated by a customary code'.⁸⁸

(e) One may question whether Peters adequately captures the essence of morality in the two formal elements he proposes (rational autonomy and concern for others). A rationally autonomous person does not necessarily choose moral principles: on careful reflection such a person may decide that he should always act in a way that best serves his own interests. If it is argued that some degree of

concern for others is a necessary part of any rational life, this does not exclude acting rationally in a way that disregards the kind of concern for others that many moral theorists, including Peters, would expect.

2 The last point leads to some questions about Peters's treatment of content in morality. In taking a rational approach to morality, the principles one employs are not peculiarly moral. To identify moral principles — even those with a formal character such as 'to treat everyone fairly' or 'to be concerned for the well-being of others' — it is necessary to refer to what morality is about. In other words, as we saw in the discussion of Warnock, an understanding of the moral sphere must be approached through what we take to be its proper content. While Peters acknowledges the importance of content in the application of moral principles, he treats the latter as existing quite independently of the content and identifiable as part of the rational form of morality. But principles (and ideals and standards) are embedded in moral practices, and what people propose as moral principles or mean by their formulation depends on what they recognize as the content of such practices. What 'concern for others' amounts to — not simply how it is applied — depends on interpreting it in the context of the beliefs and practices of which it is a part. As Scheler has pointed out, the secular humanitarian virtue of love differs significantly from the primitive Christian ideal of the same name.⁸⁹

The aspect of content is more significant in Peters's theory than might be supposed from his emphasis on the rational form of morality. As we saw earlier, he is not simply referring to the application of rational principles, but to an ideal of life in which the intellectual virtues and passions are central to its moral value.

Peters attempts to chart a middle course between moral rationalism and the type of moral traditionalism espoused by Michael Oakeshott.⁹⁰ While I believe his objective is a sound one, I doubt whether he succeeds in making clear just how the universal principles of the rational form of morality are related to the concrete traditions of moral life into which they are said to enter.

3 In referring to the form and content of morality Peters tends to put too much emphasis on rules. This helps to explain the importance he attaches to the stage of rule conformity. As Warnock

argues,⁹¹ although we may state what we ought morally to do in the form of rules, such rules do not add anything to the consideration of what we ought to do that is not already available in the relevant moral standards and ideals and the reasons one may have for applying or not applying them in a particular case. Teaching moral standards in the form of rules is a common practice. This may help to explain why the heteronomous rule-conformity stage has taken the shape that Piaget and Kohlberg describe and why so many people never get beyond it.⁹²

4 In relation to Peters's account of moral education, in so far as rational autonomy means that a person engages in moral practices (including the acceptance and application of moral standards) on the basis of a critical understanding of what morality is about, I would agree that it is an appropriate objective of moral education, particularly as it concerns the school. He also correctly stresses the broad range in the kinds of teaching and learning that make up the complex practice of moral education: instruction, imitation, sanctions, 'cognitive stimulation', insight, and so on. However, given the criticism in point 2, I believe the division of labour he suggests for methods along the line of the distinction between form and content is an artificial one. In the process of deepening our understanding of substantial moral concepts, there is a complex interaction between what we believe, the standards we acknowledge, the skills and attitudes we are acquiring, and how the perception of ourselves and others changes. For this reason, any of the means by which we learn — from instruction to direct experience — may contribute to any aspect of our moral development.

I have mentioned Peters's stress on rules and the place he gives rule conformity in the overall practice of morality. Assuming that the stage of rule conformity reflects popular beliefs about morality rather than a psychological necessity, and that morality is not primarily a matter of following rules (especially when the rules have no justification beyond the will of an authority), the schools should perhaps make a special effort to avert or undermine the present stage of rule conformity. As a first step it would be necessary to ensure that the rules of discipline in a school are not confused with standards of morality.⁹³

7 : CURRICULUM PLANNING IN MORAL EDUCATION

During the past decade, moral education has been increasingly recognized by general curriculum theorists as one of the fundamental areas of the explicit curriculum. Denis Lawton, for example, in *Social Change, Educational Theory and Curriculum Planning* proposes moral education as one of the five core fields of study in his design for a common cultural curriculum (the other fields being mathematics, physical and biological sciences, humanities and social sciences, the expressive arts).⁹⁴ Recently Dr Henry Rosovsky, Dean of Arts and Sciences at Harvard University, outlined six characteristics of an educated person that should form the objectives of a core curriculum. Two of them relate directly to moral education: 'an educated person is expected to have some understanding of, and experience in thinking about, moral and ethical problems'; 'we should expect an educated individual to have good manners and high aesthetic and moral standards'.⁹⁵

While there now seems to be general agreement on the importance of moral education in the curriculum, a basic issue of dispute is whether it should simply occur informally throughout the curriculum and the general life of the school or whether it should also be assigned a distinct segment of the curriculum. Supporters of the latter position argue on whether it should be a separate subject or part of an integrated field of study. Although it is difficult to generalize, I think there is fairly common agreement that some part of the curriculum should be given to an explicit study of moral issues and the nature of morality.⁹⁶ There are good reasons for this view. It is true that every part of the curriculum, if properly taught, contributes in some way to moral education. But, as the earlier discussion has indicated, morality is such a complex and fundamental part of human life that we cannot reasonably expect the understanding necessary for moral maturity to be picked up in a largely incidental and piecemeal fashion. The precise form that it is thought explicit moral education should take will reflect one's position on the kind of theoretical issues we have been examining, as well as many practical circumstances.

During the period we are reviewing, there has been something of an explosion in curriculum materials for moral education (or values education as it is now commonly referred to in North America). A useful summary of much of the recent curriculum material in values education published in the United States (with reference to some work from Canada and England) is provided by Douglas P. Superka in *Values Education Sourcebook*.⁹⁷

The authors have organized the material in relation to six main types of approach: inculcation of values; development of moral reasoning; acquisition of logical skills for the analysis of moral issues; clarification of one's values; action programs, based on analysis; and on clarification of values. Before commenting directly on two curriculum projects, I should refer to several general factors that have influenced the shape of curriculum work in moral (or values) education. I have, of course, already examined many of the broad assumptions about the nature of morality and moral development that are reflected — often uncritically — in much of this work. I shall discuss four background factors: moral pluralism; the emphasis by Bruner and others on learning the structure of disciplines and the methods of inquiry; interpretations of the distinctive role of the school; interest in integrated studies.

1 As I noted earlier, moral pluralism as a fact and policy of our society exerts constraints that must be reckoned with in the design of moral education programs, particularly those intended for use in state schools. Curriculum designers have reflected the pressure of moral pluralism in various ways. The extreme response has attempted to restrict the program to teaching and learning about morality. This approach is undesirable for several reasons: the attainment of moral values is an integral part of what is educationally valuable; the school is inevitably inculcating certain moral beliefs and attitudes; morality is such a fundamental practice in society that schools are not justified in being neutral on whether or how well children are learning to live morally.

Most curriculum designers agree that the school should help students develop morally and not simply learn about morality. Some have assumed, however, that the only appropriate task of the school in formal moral education is to provide a suitable context in which students can reflect on what their own moral values actually are and

why they hold them, become aware of the values that fellow students and others support, and learn to communicate effectively on questions involving moral values. The school is not supposed to encourage any particular moral beliefs or modes of moral thought in preference to others, or offer any critique of the values expressed or the way they are justified and applied. This approach is commonly referred to as values clarification. While it might usefully form one part of a complete program, if it were applied literally as the whole of moral education in the school, one could object that such neutrality on the part of teachers is incompatible with their role as educators. In practice, there are other grounds for criticism because exponents of values clarification tend to combine belief in a crude moral relativism (or subjectivism) with techniques intended to promote certain ways of behaving and eliminate others.⁹⁸

Another approach to curriculum design has concentrated on developing the range of logical skills and aspects of scientific method that are involved in analysing moral questions. In this view, the school takes a stand on the skills of inquiry that are appropriate and on how effectively they are employed. However, apart from the moral values implicit in a commitment to rational thought, the school remains neutral on the moral substance of the inquiry. This relatively pure form of value analysis has usually been modified by allowing the moral education program to uphold certain values that are believed to be fundamental to the whole society, and without which even the policy of pluralism could not be defended. For example, Donald Oliver and James Shaver in *Teaching Public Issues in the High School* assume as a common core of moral beliefs what Myrdal has called 'The American Creed'.⁹⁹ Even Jack Fraenkel's scheme, which is preoccupied with skills of analysis, includes respect for the principle of equal consideration for everyone.¹⁰⁰ Apart from the question of the methods used, whether value analysis contributes effectively to moral education depends on its being an integral part of a more comprehensive program. The isolated development of logical skills (e.g. classifying, comparing, hypothesizing) in relation to moral issues is not in itself moral education. It may simply enable a person to engage more skilfully in the intellectual exercise of discussing moral problems. In isolation, the methods of analysis are also more likely to become distorted. There is a tendency, I think, to

assimilate moral argument closely to the model of either mathematics or science. In Fra- for example, there tends to be too sharp a separation between normative and factual aspects, and between the cognitive and effective.

A further response to pluralism is provided by the distinction between the form and substance of moral beliefs. The formal features are not simply of a logical kind as in value analysis, but are said to be distinct from moral principles and judgments. As we saw earlier, this separate form and content in morality has been characteristic of moral theory. Hare's account of it has been particularly influential in the work of recent theorists of moral education. Among Kohlberg in his theory of developmental stages has presented the most elaborate application of the distinction. It will be remembered, however, that in his scheme the formal characteristics of the stages of moral judgment — which are held to be both conceptually and morally superior — involve the acceptance of universal principles of justice. Hence, on the basis of his theory, if the school is noting the higher cognitive levels of response to moral problems, an objective that could not be held to offend moral pluralism, also inevitably leading students to accept universal principle.

In his sensitivity to the moral pluralism, Kohlberg is not content to leave the matter with the mysteries of the inexorable developmental stages. He holds that there cannot be any objection in the United States to a education program that endorses human rights and principled justice, for these values are central to the Constitution itself.¹

In practice, Kohlberg's program of moral education can be interpreted as an example of a modified value analysis approach mentioned above, but grown from a particular theory about the way in which the skills of moral judgment develop in relation to the common content of justice. The school may legitimately defend. In the earlier comments on Kohlberg, I argued that his stages of moral reasoning and his retention of the place of justice in morality are not neutral in relation to conflicting moral systems.

On the substance of moral judgments, value pluralism has encouraged the practice, often recommended in moral education programs,

that teachers should be neutral on at least all controversial moral questions.

Generally, therefore, moral education programs have responded to pluralism by concentrating on the procedures for making moral judgments (assumed to be non-controversial) and by limiting the content endorsed to those beliefs that are commonly held or at least are not thought to be open to legitimate dispute. On the conclusions people reach in answering moral questions, particularly controversial ones, programs have often advocated that teachers should be neutral.

It is unfortunate that there has not been a sufficiently thorough examination of what a justifiable policy of moral pluralism amounts to and what it enjoins on the practice of education. It has been too readily assumed — as, for example, by exponents of values clarification — that pluralism requires the adoption of moral relativism or that teachers should act neutrally on any disputed moral issue in the society. I shall return to these points later.

2 Various educational theorists in the 1960s, of whom Jerome Bruner was probably the most influential, claimed that disciplines were made up of several key structural features and that these should form the main object of schooling.¹⁰² One of the structural features given special attention by Bruner was the method of inquiry, the set of procedures by which problems, hypotheses and theories in a discipline are formulated and tested. Learning how to construct and test knowledge was given priority over learning a body of established theory. Bruner supported his views mainly through an appeal to mathematics and physics, although he later applied them to social science in the program, *Man: A Course of Study*. It has been argued by a number of philosophers (e.g. Hirst, Scriven, Wilson) that morality can be treated as a discipline with various structural features, including a method of inquiry for testing and arriving at judgments.¹⁰³ Hence, even apart from the question of moral pluralism, one of the major trends in recent general curriculum theory has encouraged a preoccupation with a method of thought in the design of moral education programs.

It is beyond the scope of this discussion to assess the underlying theory.¹⁰⁴ I have already suggested that at least in the moral sphere the form of thought cannot be so easily disengaged from the employment of substantial moral concepts. In addition, morality is not in

the strict sense a discipline (or theoretical activity) as, say, mathematics or physics. It would be a mistake, therefore, to assume that even if the educational task in mathematics or physics consisted essentially in teaching and learning a mode of inquiry, the same must hold for morality.

It has been argued by Kohlberg and others that by concentrating on the form of moral reasoning, the school avoids the danger of indoctrination. If we assume that the form of moral reasoning can be taught independently of content, there is still the difficulty of serious disagreement over the nature of reasoning and justification in morality. To induce a person to accept a disputed mode of reasoning as though it were the one correct way is probably a more mis-educative act than to inculcate a disputed belief.

3 The attention to structure and modes of inquiry fits into a more general debate about the proper scope of the school's role. There has been a tendency in the past few decades for the school to be treated virtually as an all-purpose institution. Not only is the whole of education identified with schooling, but it is supposed that the school is the appropriate agency for remedying all kinds of social ills — from the failure of parents to the failure of the economic system. The logic of this position requires the school to attempt the impossible task of providing the appropriate conditions for every facet of moral development, in particular to compensate for the experiences of family and neighbourhood that distort or fail to promote a child's moral growth.

Others argue that schooling has a limited, but indispensable, role in the total process of a person's education. Whether one accepts Bruner's version or not, I think there are good reasons for this interpretation. Although I shall not attempt to argue the case here, I would claim that the school's proper task is to impart the systematic knowledge and skills that enable a person to participate with understanding in the main practices of a culture.¹⁰⁶ This outcome is not likely to be achieved except through a deliberate process of teaching and learning. Granted this interpretation, it is clear that in moral education the school should give particular attention to the knowledge and intellectual skills in, and relating to, morality on which an adequate understanding of the practice depends. The focus of many recent curriculum programs on learning how to think about moral

questions is, thus, thoroughly consistent with what I agree is the special concern of the school. What I question, however, is (i) the tendency to treat this aspect as though it were the whole of the school's distinctive contribution to moral development, and (ii) the assumption that skills of inquiry in morality can be effectively learnt independently of content. As I suggested earlier, moral maturity depends crucially on the understanding we have of substantial moral concepts. Although the school should give priority to knowledge and skills affecting the practice of morality, the practice is such that this aspect cannot succeed as moral education — although it might be good training in logic — unless it is integrally related to acquiring appropriate moral feelings, attitudes, and dispositions and to acting morally well.

4 The recent enthusiasm for integrated curricula has influenced the kinds of programs designed for moral education. Many of them have an integrated content or are intended for use with various subjects. Among the different patterns and principles of integration, two of the more ambitious approaches draw on morality as a significant dimension. The first is the organization of learning in relation to important themes to which a broad range of subject areas contribute (e.g. poverty, war, family, energy, communication). The second, in which the moral aspect is even more significant, focuses on the skills of practical inquiry and the ability to relate knowledge from many sources in the attempt to reach a decision on large-scale social problems (e.g. the mining of uranium, the construction of a freeway in a city, the legalizing of marijuana).

In these approaches, moral education is usually treated as an integral part of a Social Studies or Humanities program. Given the complexity of the topics being examined, a multi-disciplinary study is certainly desirable. Again, however, I would stress that at its best this kind of study makes up only one facet of moral education. It may have little to do with the kind of understanding one needs in order to enhance the quality of one's personal moral life and the undramatic moral decisions that are made from day to day. From a pedagogical point of view, although the macro-problems may provide motivation and a sense of relevance, there is the difficulty that students usually lack the skills for critically appreciating the content that they draw from various disciplines.

Programs in moral education often involve the much less complex form of integration in which it is associated with another subject in the curriculum. The most common partnerships have been with religion, literature, history, social studies, and political education.¹⁰⁶ Recently, moral education has been linked with cinema studies and legal studies. Under various aspects, it could be treated in relation to any subject of the curriculum (there is, for example, a significant moral dimension to several of the topics in the Australian Science Education Project material). One critical danger for the teaching of morality in the context of another subject is that the distinctive character of one or both (particularly the kind of knowledge and mode of justification proper to each) may be compromised. Thus, for example, when morality is learnt as part of religion, it is difficult to see that moral principles may be valued independently of belief in a divine being, eternal retribution, and so on; when morality is studied in the context of law the distinction between legal and moral obligation is easily obscured and moral standards tend to be interpreted as laws; when literature is combed for moral lessons its distinctive nature as art is abused and the unique moral impact it is capable of having is frustrated. I am not suggesting that formal moral education should not be associated with one or several other subjects or be part of a more ambitious integrated plan. The point is that curriculum designers and teachers need to understand the fundamental differences as well as similarities between morality and the subjects with which it is combined. Against this general background, I shall now make some specific comments on two curriculum projects in moral education. As I have indicated, many recent projects that include aspects of moral education are much broader in intention. Often, as with *Man: A Course of Study*, they include a comprehensive range of objectives for the study of the social sciences. The projects I have chosen are more directly focused on moral values. Apart from their distinctive merits and defects, they offer some interesting contrasts and illustrate a number of the general features I have discussed.

The Humanities Curriculum Project

The work on this project, sponsored by the Schools Council and Nuffield Foundation, was begun in 1967 under the direction of Lawrence Stenhouse. The development of the materials was com-

pleted in 1970 and their evaluation in use in 1972. A summary statement of the scope and rationale of the project is presented in *The Humanities Project: An Introduction*.¹⁰⁷

The project is intended to provide an option for teachers in the broad area of Humanities who are working with students in the middle forms of the secondary school. Although the material was originally to be designed for students of average and low ability, it finally catered for the full range of ability. The project offers a form of integrated curriculum. In particular, it draws from the subject areas of literature and the arts (including film), religion, history, and behavioural sciences. The main thread of integration (or synthesis) is the crucial role that personal values play in all these subjects.

The designers seem to have accepted the fairly common view, to which I referred in the first chapter, that because value judgments cannot be settled by evidence and experiment in the manner of empirical claims, they are essentially and incurably controversial. At least they claim that, as values are part of the substance of subjects in the Humanities, any significant issue they study is (necessarily?) controversial.

The project has developed materials on the following issues: war, education, the family, relations between the sexes, poverty, people and work, living in cities, law and order. A proposed unit on race relations was withdrawn because it seemed too explosive. (There was also a conviction among the designers and others that, despite the de facto controversy on race relations, it ought not be accepted as an open issue.) The broad aim in the study of the various issues is 'to develop an understanding of social situations and human acts and of the controversial value issues which they raise'.¹⁰⁸ In this context, understanding implies the ability to use the data supplied by research and imagination to build an appropriate and consistent interpretative map which structures a new experience and relates it to the individual's own experience and situation.¹⁰⁹

The designers have set out five main premises which the project is intended to reflect:

- 1 That controversial issues should be handled in the classroom with adolescents;
- 2 That the teacher accepts the need to submit his teaching in controversial areas to the criterion of neutrality at this stage of education, i.e. that he regards it as part of his responsibility not to promote his own view;

3 That the mode of inquiry in controversial areas should have discussion, rather than instruction, as its core;

4 That the discussion should protect divergence of view among participants, rather than attempt to achieve consensus;

5 That the teacher as chairman of the discussion should have responsibility for quality and standards in learning.¹¹⁰

The project focuses on group discussion as the key method of learning. The materials for each of the issues consist largely of systematically arranged printed excerpts from a wide range of sources: literature, biography, history, sociology, newspapers, etc. They also include visual materials (photographs, cartoons, stills from films, art reproductions), tape recordings, and a detailed list of recommended films. On the issue *People and Work*, for example, there are 238 separate items in the teacher's set. These materials are intended to be supplemented by items from the teacher and other members of the group as well as by people invited to speak with the group.

The teacher plays a crucial role in the conduct of the discussion. As chairman, he must introduce each general issue in a way that stimulates the group to raise questions for discussion; he has to organize these questions according to their logical character (e.g. those seeking information, those calling for a value judgment); he must decide what 'evidence' (items from the material resources) needs to be introduced to provoke discussion or ensure that diverse points of view are adequately represented; he has to guide the discussion so that it remains relevant and productive; . . . and so on. In summary, as chairman the teacher is 'responsible for the conditions of the inquiry, its coherence and the standards of judgment appropriate to it'.¹¹¹

One of the key features of the Humanities Project method, and one on which there has been dispute, is the condition that the teacher should practise what the project calls 'procedural neutrality'. What this means is that, in the study of any issue that involves a value judgment in its resolution, the teacher should adopt an explicit policy of not disclosing what his own views on the issue are. The project's argument is that, because questions depending on value judgments are essentially controversial in the society, the school is not justified in expressing or expecting its teachers to support an 'official' line; and, because of the weight given to a teacher's opinion, neither is it justifiable to allow teachers to state their own position simply as a

sincerely held point of view. It seems to me that the argument in effect invokes an epistemological principle (that conclusions based on value judgments are relative or at least cannot be shown to be more or less defensible); a moral principle (that public institutions should not take a stand on disputed value questions); and a pedagogical principle (that students are less likely to develop their abilities to investigate moral issues if they know the teacher's opinion). The authors of the project have stressed that procedural neutrality by no means entails an attempt by the teacher to be value neutral. He obviously must be committed to the educational value of learning to discuss controversial issues rationally. And commitment to rational inquiry (as we saw in discussing R. S. Peters) involves certain moral values, such as respect for other persons.

Another feature of the project that deserves to be noticed is its stress on the assessable character of certain key learning outcomes that it is intended to promote. While performance during discussion is not to be assessed, there is a range of knowledge and skills that can be tested in order to show how effective participation in the project has been in individual cases. The kinds of tests suggested by the project refer to two broad skills: the ability to make logical inferences and sustain logical consistency; and the ability to organize evidence and use it in a way that accounts for balance, sufficiency, and relevance.¹¹²

The Humanities Project provides a very flexible arrangement of materials for synthesizing the resources of many disciplines in relation to the study of moral values. A certain amount of the 'evidence' has a rather limited application in time and place; however, the project is intended to stimulate teachers to devise appropriate materials for themselves. The project very clearly belongs to the type of moral education program that separates the skills of judgment in the moral sphere from the content of the conclusions reached (although what commitment, if any, there is to substantial moral principles and concepts is unclear); while there is some attention to attitudes and feelings (especially empathy), the project is directed predominantly to the intellectual skills for analysing moral questions and to the relevant factual knowledge; the problem of pluralism is handled through a combination of the above distinction of process and content together with procedural neutrality on the part of the teacher.

How educationally effective the project might be expected to be in practice depends, I think, on at least two crucial conditions. First, although the success of any curriculum material must rely on the skills and knowledge of the teachers who implement it, in the Humanities Project the teacher's role is not only of critical importance but demands very complex skills and a high level of personal integrity. Second, it would be necessary for the curriculum as a whole to provide students with a systematic introduction to a number of the disciplines on which the project draws. Otherwise they lack an appropriate background for interpreting much of the material they are trying to relate to moral issues, and are likely to gain a distorted notion of the sources (i.e. of literature, history, sociology, etc.).

Although the project's materials could be effectively used without accepting all the assumptions of its designers, defects in the blueprint may be expected to have undesirable consequences. There are several important respects in which I believe the Humanities Project is mistaken or at least unsatisfactory. In the present context, I shall focus on two issues:

1 As I have already pointed out, the designers seem to take the view that conclusions based on value judgments cannot be correct or mistaken, or assessed as more or less adequate or justified. Presumably the same would be said about differences on what should count as a moral principle. What matters is that people should be able to argue in a logically sophisticated way to whatever conclusions they reach. But if people cannot be correct or mistaken — or at least more or less justified — in the moral principles they espouse or the decisions they make, why should it be important for them to become skilful at analysing moral issues and arguing to moral conclusions? Surely, in these conditions, the understanding of controversial moral issues does not consist in grasping and assessing the relative merit of arguments, but in being able to explain empirically what causes people to come to different moral beliefs and decisions from one another. Unless we really care about the decisions people make on issues of poverty, race relations, conditions of work, etc., and believe that learning how to analyse such issues is likely to lead to morally better conclusions, it is difficult to see the point of the exercise — at least as a contribution to moral education.

2 I shall refer to the project's specific policy of teacher neutrality in a comment at the end of this review. What I would stress here is that while a teacher may not declare his position on a controversial question (and may be justified in not doing so), he is far less neutral in the conduct of the program than might be supposed. Thus he is endorsing procedures and assumptions about moral inquiry (e.g. on the separation between facts and values) that are disputed; he has to make decisions on what evidence is significant; presumably, he also has to take some stand on what principles and reasons count as morally acceptable. To put the point in another way, if 'procedural neutrality' were followed in a fully consistent fashion, it would ramify far beyond the conflicting answers that people give to particular moral questions. The project designers' own unwillingness to accept that controversy on race relations — unlike, for example, abortion — was an 'open issue' illustrates the difficulty of a rigorous policy of procedural neutrality.

Lifeline (Schools Council Project in Moral Education)

The curriculum was designed over a period of five years on the basis of surveys of a large number of adolescents and schools and the assessment of the materials in practice. The underlying theory together with an outline of the program is presented by members of the project (Peter McPhail, J. R. Ungood-Thomas, and Hilary Chapman) in *Moral Education in the Secondary School*.¹¹³

I shall not attempt to discuss the empirical research to which Lifeline appeals. However it is important to notice that the content of the materials has been strongly influenced by the responses of a large number of adolescents to three questionnaires. These questionnaires were intended to establish how adolescents characterized 'good' and 'bad' treatment from adults and peers and the kinds of situation in which they felt uncertain about what they should do. In summary, they identified treatment as 'good' when it showed consideration for their needs, interests, and feelings and 'bad' when it failed to do so. Most of them also assumed that this was how other people felt. In a curious argument (to which I will refer later) the authors concluded from their survey that because adolescents enjoyed being treated with consideration and disliked the opposite, the showing of consideration was the fundamental moral value, and learning to act with

consideration for the needs, interests, and feelings of other people was the essential task of moral education.

The materials have been designed specifically to help students learn to make choices based on consideration for others. They are intended for use mainly with 12—16-year-olds. Although there is a strong emphasis on values clarification in the way the authors interpret the use of the materials, this is modified by the commitment to encourage concern for others. Also, despite their ambivalence, the authors finally agree that not every judgment on a moral question is as good as any other.¹¹⁴

The program consists of three sets of curriculum materials. In the first, called *In Other People's Shoes*, there are three series of cards that present situations (through words and pictures) in which students are to imagine themselves and, in the first, to decide what they would do ('Sensitivity' series, e.g. 'a friend borrows your things without asking you'); in the second, to think out the consequences of an action ('Consequences' series, e.g. 'someone puts concrete blocks on the railway lines'); in the third, to understand how another person sees a situation ('Point of View' series).¹¹⁵ All the situations are familiar ones and, apart from the series on consequences, they generally involve two or a few people in direct contact. The areas of conflict include sex relations, age, social class, race, culture, politics, and personality.

The second set of materials is entitled *Proving the Rule?* It is made up of five booklets in which problems that arise for individuals in various social contexts (e.g. in the family, at school, at work, as a citizen) are examined. The materials discuss, for example, the notions of individual and social identity, rules, conflicts of interest, duties.

In the third set, *What Would You Have Done?*, the focus moves to large-scale moral problems that affect human beings in various societies and cultures. The booklets present six case studies of incidents that have occurred during the present century. The issues include racial conflict, persecution, drug-addiction, compassion.

Overall there is a sequence in the materials from moral problems that arise between two individuals to those that affect people as members of increasingly larger social groups, up to the problems that concern human beings across cultures and societies.

The authors suggest a variety of methods for using the materials.

As with the Humanities Project, the main weight is placed on group discussion. However, the authors also strongly encourage various experiences of role playing (including the writing and acting of plays) and the use of debates, court-room type presentations and other ways of dramatizing issues in the context of the discussion group.

On the place of the materials in relation to the curriculum generally, the authors argue against having a separate unit for moral education. Their main reason seems to be that, because the teachers and students responding to their inquiry believed every person has a responsibility for moral behaviour, all teachers should take some part in moral education. Although this reason rejects specialist teachers for moral education, it has nothing to do, of course, with the question of teaching it as a separate subject. In any case, the authors favour the informal use of their materials in association with another subject and mention Religious Education, the Humanities, English and General Studies as the most likely candidates. They also note that the program employs and develops various kinds of knowledge and skills that link it with other parts of the curriculum (e.g. recognition of verbal and non-verbal cues, vocal and written expression, scientific knowledge about the consequences of action).

Like the Humanities Project, Lifeline depends crucially on the role of the teacher. Apart from the skills for implementing the materials, the teacher has a special responsibility to protect and exemplify the moral value of consideration for others in the conduct of discussion etc. (what the authors call 'the morality of communication'). On the question of procedural neutrality as advocated by the Humanities Project, the authors of Lifeline argue that, while short-term non-commitment may be useful in encouraging children to think for themselves, in general the teacher's own position on a moral issue should be made known. Their reasons, briefly, are these: adolescents expect it (65 per cent of the group in their survey); the teacher's views provide an important source of value judgments; as someone who knows children's needs, the teacher's expression of opinion is likely to be more helpful than no comment at all; teachers would otherwise have to act in a strained and abnormal way.

The designers of Lifeline stress that learning to be considerate is more effectively 'caught' from the whole atmosphere of the school than from direct teaching. To encourage a favourable atmosphere

they have published a handbook called *Our School* to accompany the materials. It proposes how the practice of democracy can be introduced into the organization of the secondary school.

Although the authors stress the unity of theory and practice, it is fortunate for them, I think, that the Lifeline materials are such that they can be disengaged from the theory on which they are based. While the authors are mistaken in treating consideration for the needs, interests, and feelings of others as though it were the whole of morality, it is nevertheless an important aspect. The materials they have designed for this aspect are directly relevant to the experience of adolescents (although some adaptation would be needed for use in Australia) and the sequence in which they have been organized is psychologically and pedagogically sound. Because of their stress on the moral issues of daily life and their effort to encourage attitudes of care for others, the Lifeline materials provide an excellent counter-balance to the many moral education programs that concentrate on skills of reasoning in the application of impersonal principles of justice and freedom to large-scale social issues.

The theoretical justification offered by the authors of Lifeline is extraordinarily weak. I can perhaps best illustrate this claim by noting two aspects of the theory.

1 The authors have worked on the premise that whatever treatment adolescents say they want to receive is what they ought to receive. Naturally enough it was found that adolescents enjoyed being shown consideration for their needs, feelings, and interests and identified such treatment as 'good'. On this basis, the authors draw the conclusion that everyone ought to show consideration for everyone else. But, despite their optimism, they realize that many adolescents do not enjoy showing consideration for others and that, for some at least, their needs, interests, and feelings are satisfied by various forms of dominance and aggression, and even violence. (Historically human beings have not been conspicuous for showing concern for those beyond their own group.) Given the kind of crude 'is to ought' argument supported by the authors of Lifeline, they should thus have concluded that if people have a need to act aggressively and enjoy it, they ought to act aggressively.

As we saw in the discussion of Murdoch and Warnock, there is a connection between moral principles and human needs, interests, and

feelings. But the argument is a complex one in which there must be discrimination and judgment on the needs etc. that people actually have, and thus on the relevance that the promotion or frustration of an individual's enjoyment has for moral decisions.¹¹⁶

In addition to the simplistic 'is to ought' argument, by relying almost entirely on what adolescents find good, bad, and morally difficult, the authors of *Lifeline* have committed its content to the limited vision that an adolescent must inevitably have of morality. Moreover they do not seem to have taken account of how much the perceived needs etc. of the subjects in their survey have been shaped by a particular set of social and other factors.

2 Despite their belief that people generally experience pleasure in being considerate, the authors recognize the importance of providing strong motivation for acting in this way. They argue that by learning to be considerate to others, we build up harmonious human relationships which promote mental health and happiness. Aggressive behaviour has the opposite effect: it provokes stress which leads to mental illness. In Chapter 4 of *Moral Education in the Secondary School*, the authors set out a long and confused list of reasons why people should treat one another with consideration. Their general message is that, if we do act with consideration for others, we will find that it is pleasant in itself and can be to our own advantage in various ways. Ironically, if one were to base concern for others on many of the motives proposed by the authors, one would really be engaging in a practice of calculated self-interest rather than morality.¹¹⁷ In fact, from this aspect of the authors' theory, the *Lifeline* program could be interpreted more as learning to become a happy, adjusted, agreeable, socially efficient person rather than a morally good person.

The *Lifeline* project raises an interesting and complex question about the relationship between the underlying questions of theory and the design of curriculum materials. Without attempting to explore the issue here, I would stress at least three general points: (i) A curriculum program cannot be intelligently developed without reflecting, at least implicitly, a complex context of theory about the general nature of education, the nature and purpose of the particular field of study, how human beings learn and develop, etc. (ii) Whether the materials produced can be separated from their particular theoretical

context depends on the range of the objectives and the degree of systematic structure. (iii) Even when materials, such as those of Lifeline or the Humanities Project, can be employed without accepting the theoretical assumptions of their designers, they can be applied intelligently only by being interpreted and adapted in the light of an alternative theoretical perspective.

The Australian work that bears comparison with the 'new wave' of curricula in values education is, of course, the Social Education Materials Project (SEMP).¹¹⁸ I have not selected it for detailed examination for two reasons. First, my knowledge of it is limited to the handbook for teachers and workshop leaders, and secondly, as far as one can tell from the outlines in these handbooks, the materials encompass a substantially broader range of objectives than those of moral education. At the same time, moral issues (both personal and social) seem to play a role of varying significance in many of the units in each of the six broad topics (e.g. the discussion of driving behaviour, consumerism, poverty in Australia, the place of value systems in decision making, the nature of marriage, aggressive human behaviour, racist attitudes, problems of underprivileged countries).¹¹⁹ From the comments on valuing and the excerpts on moral education in the workshop handbook, it seems that SEMP advocates a composite of the main recent approaches to values education: learning to clarify one's values, learning the logical skills for analysing value questions, and developing higher levels of moral reasoning through the discussion of dilemmas. If my interpretation based on the handbook is correct, the various comments in this review on the scope and limitations of these methods in moral education are relevant to SEMP. One would need to know more about the moral values to which SEMP is committed and the role expected of the teacher in relation to conflicting moral views. (A hint that the teacher should be more than a neutral umpire is given in the notes on valuing: he should try to prevent the study of values from reinforcing prejudices.) An important feature of the project's materials is that they may be very flexibly used in relation to a range of subjects and in different styles of curriculum. I would think that any teacher whose interest in moral education is more specific than that of the project would be able to adapt from its resources very useful materials for that purpose.

8 : CONCLUSION

A persistent background question during the course of this review has been that of how teachers should treat the content of morality in a society that is morally pluralistic. We have seen that many recent curriculum programs seem in effect, if not design, to have mitigated the difficulty of pluralism by focusing the task of the school in moral education on the processes of inquiry and the provision of factual information related to moral judgments. If the position I have taken on a number of recurring themes during the discussion is correct, this strategy does not adequately respect the nature of morality, and in any case does not save teachers from taking a stand on disputed issues.

Firstly the complex nature of the practice of morality has been illustrated from various points of view. The use of reason in justifying moral principles and resolving moral problems is only part of what morality is about. It also consists in certain emotions and attitudes, in the quality of personal consciousness and one's dispositions to act, and in what one actually does. Theorists of moral education, like ethical theorists, often succumb to the temptation of oversimplifying, even in relation to a single dimension of moral practice. It is obvious that the school, even if it were not constrained by pluralism, should not and cannot take on the whole of moral education. The question is how the task can be divided in a way that respects both the nature of morality and the distinctive objectives of schooling.

Secondly the tendency to draw a sharp distinction between facts and values has been criticized on several occasions during the review. Not only may moral assertions be factual (e.g. that someone has made a promise or told a lie), but just as facts provide grounds for moral beliefs so moral beliefs influence our interpretation of facts and even what we perceive as facts. The learning of general logical skills and factual information that are relevant to the examination of moral issues may be an aid to moral education, although it should not be confused with it. But when a curriculum program assumes that moral argument consists in the use of general logical skills for

combining moral beliefs — which belong to a mysterious world of personal choice on which the school is not competent to speak — with relevant facts, it distorts the nature of the relationship between facts and values in moral inquiry.

Thirdly there have been frequent critical references in the review to the claim that the moral sphere is distinguished by a form or method of thought independently of any particular content. We saw how influential this view has been in recent theory of moral education and the design of curriculum materials. In summary, it was argued that (i) the nature of morality is such that the form of specifically moral argument (as distinct from general logical skills) cannot be properly employed independently of what is thought to be the content of moral reasons,¹²⁰ and (ii) because there is serious dispute on the form of moral inquiry, it does not offer teachers an escape from the pressures of pluralism.

Many recent curriculum programs seem to assume that the skills of moral inquiry and judgment are related to the practice of morality in the way that the skills of mathematics or physics are related to, say, the practice of engineering. This view radically misunderstands the essential relationship that moral inquiry has to practice. Questions in morality are characteristically of a practical kind: we are concerned whether our attitude towards someone is justified, we have to decide how to act in a particular situation, etc. Inquiry into these questions is intimately linked with distinctive moral emotions, attitudes, and dispositions. These latter form a crucial bridge between judgment and action.

It needs to be stressed that the affective aspect of moral inquiry is not related in a merely contingent way to the cognitive. As with other significant human practices, concepts form an integral part of morality. It is a necessary condition of learning such concepts (e.g. 'truth-telling', 'lying', 'honesty', 'fairness', 'respect for life', 'murder') as part of the practice of morality that we would acquire attitudes of approval or disapproval and would experience certain emotions (e.g. sympathy, disgust, remorse, guilt) in relation to objects, actions, situations to which we apply the concepts. It is not as though we learn moral terms in a purely factual way at first and only later attach a moral sense, as we may learn a word like 'energy' and later add scientific knowledge. Nor is the affective component an incident-

tal appendage in the way that we associate various personal feelings with terms like 'red', 'autumn', 'ice-cream'.

It follows that, to a large extent, moral argument and judgment consist in determining how a situation, an action, a person is most appropriately to be described in substantial moral terms. In using these terms we bring to bear attitudes of approval or disapproval and related emotions. The logic of a moral argument is to arrive at an accurate description that has the character of an evaluation.¹²¹ Learning to engage in such description with precision and discrimination is a fundamental aspect of moral education in the school. Obviously this cannot happen unless teachers attend directly to substantial moral concepts and employ them with the commitment that their nature as moral concepts entails. Vision, as Murdoch stresses, is a key metaphor in interpreting morality. The quality of moral life depends crucially on how people see themselves, other people and things, their particular situation, the general conditions of human life. And this, in turn, depends on the range of moral concepts they possess and how deeply they understand them.¹²²

If the school must, then, give a central place to content in moral education, how is it to respond to the problem of pluralism? In a discussion of this question elsewhere,¹²³ I argued that the school in pursuing its educational purpose may actively promote the moral values associated with the tradition of critical rationality (e.g. honesty, integrity, humility, objectivity, impartiality) and may also legitimately encourage the somewhat overlapping moral values that support pluralism itself as a moral policy (e.g. personal freedom, tolerance, fairness, respect for persons). It should be noticed that moral pluralism is intended fundamentally to secure conditions in which people are free from force in the acceptance or expression of moral beliefs. It does not entail a commitment to relativism or to diversity as desirable for its own sake. And it does not commit the members of a society to absolute tolerance. Thus the school is not required by the policy of pluralism to respect beliefs or practices that undermine any of the values on which the policy is based. On the other hand, the school should not interpret the policy to mean that it may endorse any moral view simply because there happens to be consensus on it in the society. Some of the issues on which there is general agreement may be as much in need of critical examination as

the controversial ones.

It might be objected that the core of values I have defended is hardly substantial enough for an adequate program of moral education. Certainly this will be the view of anyone who looks to the state schools to uphold a particular ideal of the moral life. These schools (and any private school that serves a morally diverse population) must work on something like the distinction that P. F. Strawson proposes between ethical ideals and social morality.¹³⁴ The latter consists of the moral demands that must be accepted in a society in order to secure the conditions in which the more inclusive, and diverse, ethical ideals can flourish. While the values of various ethical ideals in the society would of course enter the moral education program and be reflected in the discussion of moral questions, the school's task would be restricted to defending the content of social morality. As Strawson points out, because of fundamental common human interests that any human community must take into account, a social morality will include some universal principles (e.g. of justice, truth-telling and honesty, abstention from inflicting injury, mutual help for basic needs). These principles provide criteria by which particular aspects of ethical ideals or a given society's social morality can be critically assessed.

Kohlberg's claim that the public schools should focus on questions of human rights and justice could be interpreted in terms of Strawson's distinction. However, I believe it gives too narrow an account of social morality. A more satisfactory view of the basic common morality is presented in Warnock's *The Object of Morality*, which was discussed in the second chapter of this review. Despite their preoccupation with the common social morality, the schools may still pursue something of the vision of an ethical ideal by upholding the tradition of critical rationality. Even this may be incompatible with some ethical ideals in the society. However, just as we persist with the institutions of government in a pluralist society despite the beliefs of anarchists, so it would seem that the schools may support the ideal of a life based on reasoned reflection despite the presence in the society of non-rational or irrational ethical ideals.

In addition to their concentration on the method of moral inquiry, some curriculum programs have added the further precaution that, on controversial questions at least, teachers should not express their

own view — or if they do, should stress that it is only an opinion. As we saw, such neutrality is defended on other grounds in addition to respect for pluralism. The issue of neutrality, with particular reference to the policy advocated by the Humanities Curriculum Project, has recently been examined in several articles. Perhaps the strongest rejection of this kind of neutrality comes from Mary Warnock.¹²⁵ Her main arguments are these:

1 In any field of study that involves interpretation or evaluation (e.g. history, social studies) a teacher is required to act in a fair and honest way. But it is part of teaching effectively in such a field that one would show in action what constitutes a fair and honest interpretation or evaluation of the facts. And a teacher cannot do this without stating what he thinks the evidence shows.

2 Even if a teacher could remain neutral in a field where interpretation of the facts or evaluation is an essential element,

there is a psychological objection to the spectacle of someone's remaining neutral in a highly charged dispute about a subject which is supposed to affect everyone and therefore be everyone's concern.¹²⁶

(The authors of *Lifeline* make the same point.)

3 In relation to the discussion of controversial moral issues specifically, the object is not simply to learn how to judge fairly on the evidence and to understand the arguments for and against, but also to think about what is right and wrong, good and evil. If students are to be helped to exercise their imaginations on moral issues, they must see the teacher acting as a moral agent, that is, with beliefs and feelings seriously engaged in the effort to reach a judgment on what ought to be done.

Warnock also specifically rejects the suggestion that a teacher may express his views and his reasons for them, provided he makes it clear that they are only his opinions and that others are just as valid. This suggestion, she argues, is impossible in the nature of moral judgment. Even if moral beliefs are relative, the judgments in themselves are unqualified. If, for example, we believe that racial discrimination is wrong, we do not believe it is wrong simply for us or a particular group but for everyone. In summary, Warnock expresses her position in this way:

You cannot teach morality without being committed to morality yourself; and you cannot be committed to morality yourself without

holding that some things are right and others wrong. You cannot hold that, and at the same time sincerely maintain that someone else's view of the matter may be equally good.¹²⁷

From earlier discussion it will be clear that I substantially agree with Warnock's view. I would reiterate that there are moral answers on which there could not be serious controversy and that not all points of view on controversial issues are equally justified. A teacher who is serious about reasoned inquiry must, where necessary, make these differences clear. To Warnock's case for teacher non-neutrality I would add two qualifications to be observed in practice. First, teachers must be sensitive to the possibility that, even when they give a carefully reasoned defence of their own moral views and open them to criticism, they may inhibit a full discussion by students. This is really the only ground for the procedural neutrality of the Humanities Project. Obviously it has no objection to students exercising rational persuasion on one another about the content of moral judgments. For the reasons that have been given, I think the restriction on the teacher is mistaken as a general policy. However, it may be desirable in particular cases (e.g. when students are quite inexperienced in discussing moral issues) for the teacher to postpone the statement of his own position (this view is taken by *Lifeline*). Secondly, given that the advocacy of moral content by the school is restricted to what Strawson calls social morality, teachers would need to make clear, in the presentation of their own views, which of their reasons reflected a particular ethical ideal rather than the social morality; in the case of controversial issues, they should ensure that students are acquainted with a fair statement of the reasons for the various positions; and in criticizing other positions teachers should only invoke principles of the social morality.

I have not disputed the view that in moral education the school has a special role in developing the skills of reasoned, reflective moral thought, and judgment. However, given the part that substantial concepts play in this process and what their learning involves, it is evident that the school's distinctive contribution to the development of mature moral thought is crucially dependent upon the broader moral education that is going on in the general school experience of students and in other parts of their life. Unlike some other areas of the curriculum, the moral education program has to take account of

a complex variety of influences outside the school that have a direct impact on moral development (parents, peers, TV, comics, etc.). The influence of one's family seems to be of overwhelming importance in moral education. The school may compensate to some extent for deficiencies in home background and in the role of parents; but it cannot provide a substitute. If close collaboration between school and parents is desirable for school subjects generally, it is essential for moral education.

In relation to the immediate environment of the school, over which teachers have more chance of exercising some effective control, we have seen that Kohlberg and others have stressed how critical it is for the whole organization of the school as a social group to reflect the moral principles and procedures that are at the centre of the formal moral education curriculum.

One of the most significant elements in the general moral educational work of the school, and one that has tended to be treated as somewhat old-fashioned, is the example that teachers give and its imitation. If learning to be moral could be reduced to techniques and information, the example of teachers would not be so crucial. But learning to be fair-minded, considerate, etc. is not the same as learning that these are good things or simply acquiring a technique.¹²⁸ One of the basic ways in which we learn such essential moral attitudes and dispositions is by imitating the example of others. In their concentration on the skills of inquiry into morality, many of the formal curriculum programs underplay the role of example and imitation. But, as we have just seen in relation to neutrality, in the learning of moral reasoning the example of the teacher as a moral agent is crucial. The giving of a moral example concerns all teachers and affects every aspect of the school's life. That teachers give an example of some kind or other is inevitable. How effective it is likely to be on the moral education of students depends on teachers being committed to the ideal of a critically examined life and to the standards of justice, honesty, respect, concern, and the other values that make up the social morality.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

- 1 Although I refer specifically to state (or public) schools, most of what is said in this review is also relevant to private schools. Even the issue of moral pluralism affects many private schools.
- 2 I shall refer to this question at several points during the review particularly in the last two sections in reference to the policy of procedural neutrality suggested in the Humanities Project.
- 3 The recognition of moral education as part of the explicit curriculum does not, of course, entail that it should be a separate subject. I shall comment on this question in the section on curriculum programs.
- 4 The preoccupation with dilemmas and controversial issues in moral education in part reflects the special interest of philosophers in moral argument and judgment. There is, of course, considerably more to being moral than knowing how to make sound moral decisions. Even in our moral decision making, we do not usually follow the procedure of argument that might be appropriate on the occasions when we are faced with an unfamiliar or complex moral problem.
WARNOCK, M. *Schools of Thought*. London: Faber & Faber, 1977, pp. 130-132.
- 5 HARE, R. M. *The Language of Morals*. London: Oxford University Press, 1952.
- 6 ———. *Freedom and Reason*. London: Oxford University Press, 1963.
WARNOCK, op. cit., pp. 130-131, summarizes Hare's view in this way: '... morality is a matter of a particular form of judgement which is fundamentally imperative in mood. To be a morally good person, one must from time to time utter commands to oneself which one would be prepared to conceive as commands to other people as well, and which one could justify by showing how they arise from a first principle, itself a command. Thus, rationally deriving a particular command from a general principle is at the centre of morality, and to teach morality must be to teach this kind of process'.
- 7 WILLIAMS, B. *Morality: An Introduction to Ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972. This is another work in moral philosophy, from among the large number published over the past ten years, on which I should at least make a passing comment. It is a clearly written, interesting and relatively short introduction to the subject of ethics. For those engaged in moral education, it is particularly useful in arguing the case for morality against those who ask, 'Why should I be moral?' and in examining the extent of objectivity in moral principles in relation to the claims of subjectivists and those who treat moral values as entirely relative to a cultural or social group. There is also a brief critique of utilitarianism which still exercises considerable influence both as an ethical theory and a moral system.
- 8 WILLIAMS, B. Philosophy and morals. In B. MAGEE (Ed.), *Modern British Philosophy*. London: Paladin, 1971, p. 190.
- 9 *ibid.*, pp. 193-195.
MURDOCH, I. Vision and choice in morality. In I. T. RAMSEY (Ed.), *Christian Ethics and Contemporary Philosophy*. London: SCM, 1966, p. 214.
- 10 RHEES, R. *Without Answers*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969, p. 95.
- 11 WINCH, P. *Ethics and Action*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972, Ch. 8.
- 12 MURDOCH, I. *The Sovereignty of Good*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970.
- 13 *ibid.*, p. 16.

- 14 *ibid.*, p. 53.
- 15 *ibid.*, p. 80. For a succinct statement by Murdoch of the philosophical picture of man she is attacking in *The Sovereignty of Good*, see Against dryness. In M. BRADLEY (Ed.), *The Novel Today*. London: Fontana, 1977, p. 24.
- 16 MURDOCH, *op. cit.*, p. 49.
- 17 *ibid.*, p. 77.
- 18 MURDOCH, 1966, *op. cit.*, p. 217.
- 19 MURDOCH, 1970, *op. cit.*, p. 92.
- 20 *ibid.*, p. 40.
- 21 *ibid.*, p. 97.
- 22 *ibid.*, p. 38.
- 23 *ibid.*, p. 52.
- 24 *ibid.*, pp. 103-104.
- 25 Murdoch stresses that ordinary art will not do: like 'happenings', it is taken up with 'self-consoling fantasy' and fails to exhibit the unselfish attention to what is really there in the object that is a hallmark of great art. For the discussion of the analogy with art, see *ibid.*, pp. 63-66, 84-88.
- 26 *ibid.*, pp. 86-88; the last quotation is from pp. 87-88.
- 27 Murdoch recognizes this difference and the difficulty of appealing to an impersonal ideal of 'Good'. *ibid.*, p. 72.
- 28 *ibid.*, p. 29.
- 29 Murdoch speaks of her form of justification as 'a kind of inconclusive non-dogmatic naturalism' (*ibid.*, p. 44). She acknowledges that the argument is inevitably circular, in that features of human nature are appealed to in support of moral values while the latter, in their turn, affect our perception of the features of human nature. The deficiency in Murdoch's case does not lie in the nature of such an argument, but in the lack of sufficient detail or precision in its application.
- 30 WARNOCK, G. J. *The Object of Morality*. London: Methuen & Co., 1971.
- 31 *ibid.*, p. viii.
- 32 MURDOCH, 1970, *op. cit.*, p. 71.
- 33 In this general discussion of aspects of recent moral philosophy, I have said nothing directly about work in social and political philosophy. For the most part, it has reflected the same philosophical characteristics as the work in general ethics. The fortunes of social and political philosophy tended to be more severely affected than those of general ethics by the influence of logical positivism. In their case, there were competing empirical fields in sociology and political science in which, apart from some questions on the logic of language, it seemed all the significant theorizing was to be done. In the mid-1950s the view was expressed that political philosophy was dead. Since that time there has been a healthy revival. The change of emphasis has broadly been along the same lines as that of general ethics. A good illustration of the kind of work that has been done during this period is given in the four volumes of *Philosophy, Politics and Society* that have so far appeared. The first in the series is edited by Peter Laslett, the second and third by Laslett and W. G. Runciman, and the fourth by Laslett, Runciman and Quentin Skinner: LASLETT, P., et al. *Philosophy, Politics and Society*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963, 1964, 1967, 1972.
Perhaps the most significant contribution to social philosophy in the past decade (and over a much longer period) is John Rawls's massive treatise on justice: RAWLS, J. *A Theory of Justice*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973.
- 34 In this review, I shall not refer to any work by social scientists on the

- nature of morality that is not incorporated in a theory of moral education.
- 35 DURKHEIM, E. *Moral Education: A Study in the Theory and Application of the Sociology of Education* (E. K. Wilson and H. Schnurer, trans.). Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1961.
 - 36 WILSON, J., WILLIAMS, N., AND SUGARMAN, B. *Introduction to Moral Education*, Harmondsworth, Mx: Penguin, 1967. See Bibliography, for examples of other work by each of the authors.
 - 37 See the brief discussion of Hare's position in the previous chapter.
 - 38 WILSON et al., op. cit., p. 191.
 - 39 *ibid.*, pp. 192-195. The main characteristics that Wilson lists are the ability to feel concern for others; insight into one's own feelings and the feelings of others; grasp of relevant factual knowledge; the ability to formulate rational principles of behaviour in relation to one's own needs and to the needs of others; the ability to translate these principles into action. In *The Assessment of Morality*, Wilson gives a somewhat revised and much more detailed account of the moral components: WILSON, J. *The Assessment of Morality*. Slough, Bucks.: National Foundation for Educational Research, 1973, pp. 38-39.
 - 40 HOFFMAN, M. L. Moral development. In P. H. MUSSEN (Ed.). *Carmichael's Manual of Child Psychology*, New York: Wiley, 1970, pp. 261-359.
 - 41 WRIGHT, D. *The Psychology of Moral Development*. Harmondsworth, Mx: Penguin, 1971.
 - 42 HOFFMAN, op. cit., p. 325.
 - 43 *ibid.*, p. 345.
 - 44 A substantial part of the discussion of Kohlberg is taken from a chapter I have written for a forthcoming book: CRITTENDEN, B. S. Lawrence Kohlberg: developmental psychology and moral education, In J. V. D'CRUZ AND W. HANNAH (Eds.). *Perceptions of Excellence: Studies in Educational Theory*. Melbourne: Dove Publishers, 1978, (in press) Ch. 13.
 - 45 PIAGET, J. *The Moral Judgment of the Child*. (M. Gabain, Ed.). New York: Free Press, 1965. (First published 1932.)
 - 46 KOHLBERG, L. The cognitive-developmental approach to moral education, *Phi Delta Kappan*, 1975, 56 (10), p. 673.
 - 47 RAWLS, op. cit.
 - 48 KOHLBERG, L. Stages of moral development as a basis for moral education. In C. M. BECK, B. S. CRITTENDEN, E. V. SULLIVAN (Eds.). *Moral Education: Interdisciplinary Approaches*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971, p. 69.
 - 49 TURIEL, E. Stage transition in moral development. In R. M. W. TRAVERS (Ed.). *Second Handbook of Research on Teaching*. Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1973, Ch. 23.
 - 50 KOHLBERG, op. cit., p. 672. Kohlberg lists 10 universal moral values on which the reasoning in the moral dilemmas is focused: Punishment; Property, Roles and concerns of authority; Law; Life; Liberty; Distributive justice; Truth; Sex.
 - 51 *ibid.*, p. 670.
 - 52 *ibid.*, p. 671.
 - 53 For critical discussion of the general cognitive-developmental theory, see MISCHEL, T. (Ed.). *Cognitive Development and Epistemology*, New York: Academic Press, 1971. (especially chapters by D. W. Hamlyn, S. Toulmin, P. C. Dodwell, C. Taylor)
 - 54 KURTINES, W. AND GREIF, E. B. The development of moral thought: review and evaluation of Kohlberg's approach. *Psychological Bulletin*,

- 1974, 81 (8), p. 468. For another criticism of the empirical work, see SIMPSON, E. L. Moral development research. A case study of scientific cultural bias. *Human Development*, 1974, 17, 81-106.
- 55 KOHLBERG, 1971, op. cit., pp. 55, 60.
- 56 PETERS, R. S. A reply to Kohlberg. *Phi Delta Kappan*, 1975, 56 (10), p. 678.
- 57 KOHLBERG, 1975, op. cit., pp. 672-674.
- 58 *ibid.*, p. 674.
- 59 KOHLBERG, 1971, op. cit., p. 82.
- 60 DURKHEIM, op. cit.
- 61 *ibid.*, p. 104.
- 62 *ibid.*, p. 116.
- 63 *ibid.*, p. 103 et seq.
- 64 ILLICH, I. *Deschooling Society*. New York: Harper & Row, 1970; JACKSON, P. *Life in Classrooms*. New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1968.
- 65 DREEBEN, R. *On What is Learned in School*. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1968.
- 66 KOHLBERG, L. The moral atmosphere of the school. In N. OVERLEY (Ed.). *The Unstudied Curriculum*. Washington, DC: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1970, pp. 104-127. Kohlberg comments on Dreeben's analysis, especially pp. 105-107, 111-112.
- 67 DREEBEN, R. The unwritten curriculum and its relation to values, *Curriculum Studies*, 1976, 8 (2), p. 111.
- 68 *ibid.*, p. 119.
- 69 DREEBEN, R. The contribution of schooling to the learning of norms. *Harvard Educational Review*, 1967, 37 (2), p. 211.
- 70 KAY, W. *Moral Education: A Sociological Study of the Influence of Society, Home and School*. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1975.
- 71 *ibid.*, pp. 14, 51-59. The five primary moral traits proposed by Kay are: moral judgment; gratification (the ability to defer being the main issue); personalism (the ability to treat others as persons); flexibility (ability to abstract principles from specific circumstances and to apply principles flexibly); dynamism (the ability to respond actively to one's situation); and creativity (in thinking about moral problems and applying moral principles).
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- 73 BAIER, K. Ethical pluralism and moral education. In BECK et al., op. cit., pp. 93-112.
- SCRIVEN, M. Cognitive moral education. *Phi Delta Kappan*, 1975, 56 (10), 689-694; WARNOCK, M. *Schools of Thought*. London: Faber & Faber, 1977, Ch. IV.
- 74 DEWEY, J. *Moral Principles in Education*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959 (First published 1909).
- . *Democracy and Education*. New York: Macmillan, 1916.
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- 76 BOUWSMA, W. J. Models of the educated man. *American Scholar*, 1975, 44 (2), 204-205.

- 77 PETERS, R. S. *Psychology and Ethical Development*. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1974.
- 78 *ibid.*, pp. 312-324.
- 79 PETERS, R. S. *Reason and Compassion*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973. There is substantial overlap with the material in *Psychology and Ethical Development*, Chs. 16 and 17.
- 80 Although Peters insists on the rational character of morality, he believes that the objective status of moral values is strengthened by being placed in the context of religious experience. He gives a rather vague elastic account of religion. However, the fundamental features seem to be a sense of awe in the face of man's limited capacity to understand reality, and a sense of compassion for all human beings in the effort to cope with the common human predicament.
- 81 PETERS, 1974, *op. cit.*, p. 301.
- 82 *ibid.*, pp. 252-263.
- 83 PETERS, 1973, *op. cit.*, p. 46.
- 84 PETERS, 1974, *op. cit.*, p. 330.
- 85 *ibid.*, Chs. 14 and 16.
- 86 TRIGG, R. *Reason and Commitment*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973.
- 87 *ibid.*, p. 71.
- 88 *ibid.*, p. 99.
- 89 SCHELER, M. *Ressentiment*. (W. W. Holdheim, trans.). New York: Schocken, 1971, pp. 112 et seq.
- 90 PETERS, 1974, *op. cit.*, pp. 449-453.
- 91 WARNOCK, G. J., *op. cit.*, Chs. 4 and 5.
- 92 It is not entirely clear whether Peters treats the interpretation of morality in each of the stages before that of rational autonomy as simply the reflection of psychological and social conditions, or whether he thinks they also form an integral part of a normative theory of morality. He seems to incline to the latter view.
- PETERS, 1973, *op. cit.*, p. 57.
- 93 WARNOCK, M., *op. cit.*, pp. 136-140. I do not wish to imply that rules formed on the basis of moral principles and ideals should not play an important part in moral life. There are also respects in which moral principles and ideals themselves have similarities with rules. I also recognize that, if in fact the majority of people are not capable of acting morally unless they interpret moral principles in the rule-conformity manner or need the motivation of tangible rewards and punishment, the schools will need to give most of their attention to a quite different style of moral education from the kind I am supporting in this review.
- 94 LAWTON, D. *Social Change, Educational Theory and Curriculum Planning*. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1973, p. 140.
- 95 ROSOVSKY, H. Quoted in Hard core and soft options. *Times Higher Education Supplement*, No. 268, 1976.
- 96 WARNOCK, M., *op. cit.*, pp. 129-143, argues against any distinct place for moral education in the curriculum.
- 97 SUPERKA, D. P. et al. *Value Education Sourcebook: Conceptual Approaches, Materials Analyses, and an Annotated Bibliography*. Boulder, Colo.: Educational Resources Information Center, Clearinghouse for Social Studies/Social Science Education and Social Science Education Consortium, Inc., 1976.
- 98 For critical comments on the values clarification approach see, for example, STEWART, J. S. Clarifying values clarification: critique. *Phi Delta Kappan*, 1975, 56 (10), 684-688.
- 99 OLIVER, D. W. and SHAVER, J. P. *Teaching Public Issues in the High*

- School. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966, p. 15.
- 100 FRAENKEL, J. R. *Helping Students Think and Value: Strategies for Teaching the Social Studies*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Ch. 6.
 - 101 KOHLBERG, 1975, op. cit., p. 674.
 - 102 BRUNER, J. *The Process of Education*. New York: Vintage Books, 1960, Chs. 2, 3, 4, 5;
——— *Towards a Theory of Instruction*. New York: Norton & Norton, 1966, Chs. 1, 3, 4, 8.
 - 103 See, for example, HIRST (a), op. cit.; HIRST, P. H. *Knowledge and the Curriculum*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974. (b)
 - 104 CRITTENDEN, B. S. *Bruner's Educational Theory*. (Occasional Paper No. 1). Bundoora, Vic.: La Trobe University, School of Education, Centre for the Study of Curriculum and Teacher Education, 1977.
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 - 105 I have discussed this view of education in Characteristics of quality in education. In B. S. CRITTENDEN and J. V. D'Cruz (Eds.). *Essays on Quality in Education*. Melbourne: Primary Education Publishing, 1976, pp. 1-16.
 - 106 For a discussion of recent work on the links between political and moral education, see TOMLINSON, P. Political education: cognitive developmental perspectives from moral education, *Oxford Review of Education*, 1975, 1 (3), pp. 241-267.
 - 107 SCHOOLS COUNCIL/NUFFIELD FOUNDATION. *The Humanities Project: An Introduction*. London: Heinemann Educational, 1970. For a discussion of the project from the viewpoint of curriculum research, see STENHOUSE, L. *An Introduction to Curriculum Research and Development*. London: Heinemann Educational, 1975.
 - 108 SCHOOLS COUNCIL, op. cit., p. 1.
STENHOUSE, op. cit., p. 93, says that it would have been better to delete the word 'value' as its inclusion suggests that only value issues are controversial and that value issues are necessarily controversial. This involves a significant departure from the theory expressed in *The Humanities Project: An Introduction*.
 - 109 SCHOOLS COUNCIL, op. cit., p. 33.
 - 110 *ibid.*, p. 1.
 - 111 *ibid.*, p. 20.
 - 112 *ibid.*, p. 36.
 - 113 MCPHAIL, P. *Moral education in the Secondary School*. London: Longman, 1972.
 - 114 *ibid.*
 - 115 An example from the 'Point of View' series:
 Wife: I hate visiting your parents. They spend their whole time crouched over the TV.
 Husband: What's wrong with that? They like it.
Students are asked: Do you think that there are class attitudes to TV? If so, what do you think they are and how do you think they have come about?
 - 116 The authors do not distinguish between 'need' and 'want', or even between what a person wants here and now and what is in his long-term interest.
 - 117 One of the motives suggested is that by showing consideration to another person 'we gain a measure of practical control over him. He owes us something and we can to some extent decide how and when he will

- pay'. McPHAIL, op. cit., p. 67.
- 118 CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT CENTRE. *Social Education Materials Project: Teachers Handbook and Workshop Leaders Handbook*. (P. Jones, Ed.). Canberra: CDC, 1977.
 - 119 The one example of SEMP content I have seen — the City/Art book — provides excellent material for examining the interplay of moral and aesthetic (and other) values in city planning and in the way artists depict life in a city. Moral questions also arise over the access that various groups have to works of art.
 - 120 Even a procedural principle such as, 'Show respect for other persons', can hardly be applied effectively without raising questions of substance.
 - 121 The points I have been suggesting here are discussed in more detail in CRITTENDEN, B. *Form and Content in Moral Education*. (Monograph series no. 12). Toronto: Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, 1972, pp. 32-48.
 - 122 Iris Murdoch speaks of 'moral facts' in the sense of 'moral interpretations of situations where the moral concept in question determines what the situation is, and if the concept is withdrawn we are not left with the same situation or the same facts'. MURDOCH (1966), op. cit., p. 214.
 - 123 CRITTENDEN (1972), op. cit., pp. 48-64.
 - 124 STRAWSON, P. F. Social morality and individual ideal. In I. T. RAMSEY (Ed.). *Christian Ethics and Contemporary Philosophy*. London: SCM, 1966, pp. 280-298.
 - 125 See, for example, BROWN, S. C. (Ed.) *Philosophers Discuss Education*. London: Macmillan, 1975. (Chapters by M. Warnock, R. Norman, A. Montefiore).
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WARNOCK, M. op. cit., pp. 140-142.
 - 126 BROWN, op. cit., pp. 167-168.
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